

REVISED PROJECT DOCUMENT
UNDP Lebanon

Project Title: Enhancing Community Security and Access to Justice in Lebanese Host Communities

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Award ID: 00105798

Implementing Partners: MoJ, MOIM, ISF, High Judicial Council, Bar Associations, CSOs, Municipalities and Unions of Municipalities

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PAC Meeting date: 11 September 2017

Brief Description

Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities have limited access to basic security and justice services that respond to their concrete and perceived needs, in a context of growing tensions and increased human rights violations, putting the very social fabric of communities at risk.


Lebanon is hosting a large number of Syrian refugees (about 1.5 million individuals) within “host communities” that are among the poorest municipalities of Lebanon. Host communities and Syrian refugees are often unable to access basic justice and security services. The reason is that security institutions tend to focus on law enforcement rather than violence prevention activities in communities; and access to justice institutions is unaffordable to the poor. As a result, host communities and Syrian refugees are increasingly resorting to informal justice and security institutions.

Lebanon suffers from a deep and complex governance deficit that has fuelled a deep distrust of its population in the State and sustained calls for accountability, justice, and an end to corruption. In parallel, the country is in the throes of compounded and multi-faceted crises that have exacerbated vulnerabilities, negatively affected the realization of economic and social rights of large segments of the population, and is translating into rights violations, especially amongst vulnerable groups. With rights in jeopardy, tensions mounting, insecurity rising, and rampant calls for increased accountability, the onus is on justice and human rights institutions and oversight mechanisms to deliver in a more independent, efficient and accessible manner. Similarly, the challenging national context has exacerbated the challenges facing the criminal justice and penitentiary systems, including limited resources and organizational weaknesses, poor infrastructure, and overcrowding.

The projects assumes that by (i) developing basic security and justice services for host communities and vulnerable groups in municipalities; (ii) developing the capacities of MoIM and MoJ to support municipal police and legal help desks; (iii) establishing platforms among state actors, as well as between formal and informal actors; (iv) developing capacities of national state institutions to understand and respond to local security, justice and human rights challenges; and (v) developing a people-centred culture in security and justice institutions: tensions and conflicts between host communities and Syrian refugees will decrease while building blocks for positive resilience and improved social fabric will be laid.

<p>Contributing Outcome (UNSDCF/CPD)</p> <p>UNSDCF Outcome 2: Strengthened security, stability, justice and social peace:</p> <p>CPD Outputs: <u>Output 1.1</u> Lebanon has formulated relevant green, gender- and age-sensitive legislation, policies, strategies, plans, and regulations required to implement the national reform agenda; <u>Output 2.4</u>. Civic space and access to justice expanded for women and men, racism and discrimination addressed, and rule of law, human rights and equity strengthened.</p> <p>Indicative Output(s) with gender marker:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Output 1:</u> Host communities and Syrian refugees have access to basic security services that respond to their needs- GEN 2 • <u>Output 2:</u> MoIM Governorate/District authorities and ISF provide support to municipalities to respond to basic security needs – GEN 2 • <u>Output 3:</u> Vulnerable groups, including women, have access to basic justice services – GEN 3 • <u>Output 4:</u> Enhanced access to justice, fundamental rights safeguards in the criminal justice system, and independent justice oversight mechanism are enhanced- GEN 3 	Total resources required:	USD 16 million	
		Donor Netherlands:	USD 1,222,724
		Donor Canada:	USD 6,017,955
		Donor EU	USD 3,420,780
		Donor Switzerland	USD \$200,000
		Donor United States	USD 450,000
		Global Rule of Law programme (Netherlands)	USD \$597,750
	Unfunded: (rounded)	USD 2,270,000	

Agreed by (signatures):

UNDP
<p>DocuSigned by:</p>  <p>3C8E388716144A0...</p> <p>Melanie Hauenstein UNDP Resident Representative Date: 06-Jun-2023</p>

DS
MS

The **Gender Marker** measures how much a project invests in gender equality and women's empowerment. Select one for each output: GEN3 (Gender equality as a principle objective); GEN2 (Gender equality as a significant objective); GEN1 (Limited contribution to gender equality); GEN0 (No contribution to gender quality)

I. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

***Development Challenge:** Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities are often unable to access basic security and justice services that respond to their concrete and perceived needs, in a context of growing tensions and increased human rights violations, putting the very social fabric of communities at risk.*

DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE AND THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM:

Lebanon is hosting a large number of Syrian refugees within “host communities” that are among the poorest municipalities of Lebanon. It is estimated that Syrian refugees have come to constitute more than a quarter of the country’s entire population – 1.5 million Syrian refugees for an estimated population of 5.9 million individuals.¹ Syrian refugees have taken up residence in over 1,700 host communities², putting particular pressure on those communities, including with regard to employment and access to services and infrastructure.³ The highest percentage of refugees is to be found in regions that were among the poorest and most underserved in Lebanon before the crisis – characterized notably by a lack of sufficient social services, weak infrastructure and limited livelihood opportunities.⁴ Approximately two million vulnerable people – Syrian refugees and host communities – are concentrated in 251 municipalities where social tensions and poverty are worsening fast.⁵

Host communities and Syrian refugees are often unable to access basic justice and security services: Host communities and Syrian Refugees have limited access to justice and security services, with service delivery issues being the top consideration of people.⁶ The reasons are twofold: (i) municipalities and rule of law institutions have limited capacities to deliver such services; and (ii) rule of law institutions have a strong state vs. population focus.⁷

While municipalities are the primary line of response, they have limited resources to provide basic justice and security services:

In the absence of a national plan to remedy the impact of the influx of Syrian refugees, municipalities are the primary line of response to the Syrian crisis. Municipalities have large competencies since the 1977 decentralization decree-law⁸; and were given large competencies in the area of security by the government since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis. Municipalities were instructed by the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) to take responsibility of maintaining order for host communities and Syrian refugees.⁹ However, they have limited resources, whether they are human, technical or financial, and cannot provide many of the services they are expected to deliver by law.¹⁰

This is the case for security. The municipal police is rarely known from and sought after by the population, both because of its small size and absence of service-delivery to the population. While large cities can have up to 150 municipal police officers, most of municipalities have 1 to 10 police officers, or no police officer at all. Municipal police forces are often under-funded and untrained. Municipal polices are not trained to

¹ *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (2017-2020)*, p. 8. Figures are based on estimates since Lebanon did not conduct a census since 1932; and Syrian refugees are not registered by UNHCR as of May 2015 (as per Government of Lebanon’s instructions).

² The Lebanese government did not authorize the establishment of formal refugee camps for Syrian refugees. By communities we mean areas within municipalities. Lebanon has 1108 municipalities (<http://www.cas.gov.lb/index.php/about-lebanon-en>).

³ *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (2015-2016)*. See also *The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon, A Conflict Analysis*, Norwegian Church Aid (2015), p. 3.

⁴ Notably North Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley

⁵ Lebanese Government and United Nations agreed upon Vulnerability Map (2014)

⁶ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 23

⁷ See *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016)

⁸ The law stipulates that any work having a public character or utility within the area of the municipality falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council

⁹ Cf. 2013 Byel Conference and Activation Plan for Municipal Police (2013)

¹⁰ Cf. LCPS: <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=6>.

deliver services to the population and focus instead on municipal by-law enforcement, or “serving mayors’ wishes”.¹¹

Although municipal polices are administrative polices and should perform a “social function” given their daily contact with the population, they see and seek for themselves an active role on fighting against crime (judiciary police function), particularly to address Syrian refugees issues. Municipalities resort often to short-term and reactive measures in the area of security, notably in relation to Syrian Refugees. In many areas Municipal Police enforces curfews on Syrian refugees and undertakes other duties relating to the control and supervision of Syrian refugees.¹² In some cases Municipal Police has been involved in raids against settlements of Syrian refugees. No evidence-based system has been put in place to monitor the effectiveness of the response but perception surveys demonstrate that 75 % of the respondents doubt the effectiveness of the response measures taken so far.¹³ In general, respondents do not trust their municipality to take the right action.¹⁴ In other terms, what is at stake is not only the provision of services, but services that respond to populations’ needs.

Rule of law national institutions’ support to municipalities and provision of services to host communities is limited:

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, municipalities frequently resort to the army, and to some extent to the ISF¹⁵, for support on security issues. Aside from this direct on-demand support, the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities provides municipalities with overall policy guidance (circulars) to tackle the impact of the Syrian crisis. However, there is little technical or operational support to implement such guidance. Besides, municipalities are in need of specific security-related guidance. The municipalities turn for advice and guidance to district and governorate authorities. However, those have equally limited resources and do not benefit from specific support from central institutions either. National security institutions’ (such as ISF) services to host communities and Syrian refugees is spread too thin. Their tendency to work on a concurrent instead of complementary manner limits also the impact of their intervention.¹⁶ Surveys demonstrate that while Lebanese have good faith in security institutions, they are dissatisfied users of those institutions – victims of crime in particular report that it takes too long to receive protection or to address criminal issues.¹⁷ The ISF is trusted by a bit less than half of the respondents (compared to over 80% for the LAF).¹⁸ This situation reflects overall dissatisfaction of Lebanese towards the central government when it comes to service delivery.¹⁹ It is also the result of a business-model whereby rule of law institution focus on delivering state instructions; rather than responding to the immediate needs of the population.²⁰

The same absence of services applies to the justice sector. Justice at local level is delivered by central institutions. Overall, justice institutions are perceived by many as affected by clientelism, political interference, sectarianism and as highly corrupted by the population in Lebanon.²¹ Most of the conflicts generated by the presence of Syrian refugees relate to access to local infrastructure, livelihoods and security. In addition, many conflicts in host communities relate to land rights, debts and family issues. Many potential administrative and civil cases are not brought to justice as they are the results of informal contractual relationships;²² or weak legal protection of the plaintiff – for example women that do not benefit from a solid

¹¹ Quotation by a Head of Municipal Police

¹² There appears to be no legal basis for municipal police to enforce curfews or for mayors to impose them and they may be a breach of the right to liberty of movement enshrined under article 12 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

¹³ *Citizens’ perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 8

¹⁴ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 42

¹⁵ Municipalities resort to the ISF in areas where the ISF is perceived as responsive and municipalities are in good terms with.

¹⁶ Being deeply influenced by sectarian politics, security institutions tend to have limited interactions with each other; and relationships tend to be driven by a “zero-sum game” approach.

¹⁷ *Citizens’ Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), pp.5 and 11

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.4

¹⁹ This is largely due to the central government’s shortcomings in service delivery across regions and the corresponding lack of trust in the government capabilities – *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 27

²⁰ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016), p. 9

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8

²² Lots of work contracts are reportedly not formalized

legal protection, or Syrian refugees that are not covered by any administrative status since 2015. In municipalities the population resort to informal institutions to seek advice for civil cases, solve disputes and conflicts. There is no state-run legal aid system in the country.²³ Lebanon's two bar associations are expected to provide criminal legal aid out of their own resources (*pro bono*). Syrian refugees have some access to legal aid through humanitarian agencies and actors.²⁴ There are no civil legal aid services for host communities.

As a result of the insufficient institutional response, host communities and Syrian refugees resort to informal justice and security institutions to seek advice, solve small dispute and conflicts; and/or to a web of formal and informal institutions.²⁵ However, only individuals with a strong social capital gain access to that type of informal-formal mix of services as it requires to know the social actors and being aware of the available services, whether they are state- or civil society-run. As a matter of fact, this hybrid assemblage discourages host communities as well as Syrian refugees to access formal security and justice providers.²⁶

The lack of justice and security services impact more severely the already most disadvantaged, namely the poor, women and girls, the youth, as well as Syrian Refugees:

The Poor: In host communities resorting to formal justice institutions is the privilege of the rich. Surveys demonstrate that Lebanese have even less confidence in justice than security with more than half of the respondents consider the courts to be inaccessible, unfair, ineffective, not timely and not independent.²⁷ The most disadvantaged lack both the material resources and social capital to access rule of law institutions, or even informal institutions, for solving dispute and seeking redress.

Women: Women are a particular vulnerable group given their weak legal status, exposure to discrimination as well as to SGBV.²⁸ While there is little quantitative data in respect to violence against women, 9.2% of Lebanese women said they had been the victim of SGBV.²⁹ Good progress have reportedly been made by the ISF and the judiciary since the passing of the domestic violence law in 2014.³⁰ Media have been instrumental in sensitizing broad audiences on SGBV challenges. The ISF and the judiciary increasingly take and process SGBV cases. However, those progress remain uneven and very few cases are tried in courts.³¹ Women serving prisons sentences are particularly at risk.³² As regards Syrian refugees, studies estimate that one out of three Syrian women and girls are subjected to SGBV, including sexual violence, child marriage, intimate partner violence, survival sex, forced prostitution, exploitation and abuse.³³ The majority of the population, in host communities and among Syrian refugees, does not seek redress from the state for crimes of sexual violence.³⁴ Surveys show that the first resort for responding to SGBV are the family, clan or tribe, with only 35% of the respondents that would turn to security institutions.³⁵

²³ The Beirut and Tripoli Bar Associations provide criminal legal aid for a limited number of cases due to lack of funding.

²⁴ Such as UNHCR, NRC, Caritas, etc

²⁵ Cf. Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

²⁶ *Informal Hybrid Security in Lebanon*, Lebanon Support (2016), p. 6

²⁷ *Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p.10. Important regional variation exist through with the residents of Nabathieh and South provinces more positive in their appraisals of the courts than the residents of North province that are very negative.

²⁸ According to the National Strategy for Women in Lebanon, "domestic violence is widespread and affects adult women, young females and girls alike" (*National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2011-2021*, p. 17).

²⁹ *Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 11. See also coordination documents of the Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) National Task Force, https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/working_group.php?Page=Country&LocationId=122&id=47

³⁰ The law on domestic violence enabled to recognize that women may be subjected to abuse by husbands and families need protection and legal recourse in this regard.

³¹ Out of 23 cases of killings of women by a family member between 2010 and 2013, only one case was tried.

³² Cf. *Report of the Committee against Torture*, Annex XIII "Summary account of the results of the proceedings concerning the inquiry on Lebanon", A/69/44 (2013-2014), para. 17. This is notably the case of women migrants domestic workers that "are often kept in isolation, with no contact with the outside world, while waiting hearing or deportation" – *National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2011-2021*, p. 18

³³ *The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon, A Conflict Analysis*, Norwegian Church Aid (2015), p. 7

³⁴ *Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 11

³⁵ 50% of the respondents – *Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 10

Youth: Young Lebanese and young Syrian refugees are disproportionately affected by the crisis. High levels of poverty and unemployment affect especially the youth.³⁶ As a result of the Syrian crisis, some 220,000 to 320,000 Lebanese citizens were estimated to have become unemployed, most of them being unskilled youth.³⁷ Such socio-economic situation creates a breeding ground for tensions and violence. A number of reports indicate cases of Lebanese youths involved in security incidents with Syrian refugees – for example, pretending to be police and creating checkpoints to steal people’s mobile phones and papers; or intruding into Syrian tents.³⁸ Young Syrian men seem to be particularly vulnerable because they are accused of being politically active with Islamist groups or because they are obliged to move at night due to work conditions.³⁹ Such gender profiling is reportedly affecting their daily lives and freedom of movement.⁴⁰ As a matter of fact, some surveys indicate a moderate positive correlation between age and safety perception where younger groups feel more unsafe. The perceived shortage of leaders within Syrian refugees’ communities is not to help this situation.⁴¹

Syrian Refugees: Syrian refugees are not claiming their rights and choose to avoid any security/justice mechanism, formal or informal, when they have grievances.⁴² In the rare cases where Syrian refugees decide to take action, they usually resort to informal mechanisms.⁴³ Syrian refugees use formal justice institutions only when physical violence occurs.⁴⁴ Only 6% of Syrian refugees are in contact with criminal justice institutions.⁴⁵ Whether Syrian refugees resort to informal or formal mechanisms, outcomes are rarely fair and often do not ensure long term resolution of their grievances.⁴⁶ The key actors helping Syrians resolve their problems come from their immediate social circles (family, friends and local religious leaders)⁴⁷ as well as people that are trusted and willing to interfere (Syrian/Lebanese friends), employers, and renowned fellow Syrians.⁴⁸ The Syrians’ social networks are relatively weak due to their refugee status, and even more limited in urban settings.⁴⁹ The situation of Syrian refugees seem to be most affected by national level policies, as well as political and media discourse, rather than social attitudes at local level.⁵⁰

Perceptions play an important role in the social tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees:

- A number of tensions seem to relate to major security incidents at national level rather than evidence-based threats from Syrian refugees in communities: Tension between host communities and Syrian refugees is perceived as increasing and having the potential to lead to violence. The majority of host communities’ respondents to recent surveys feel that intercommunal or sectarian violence is likely. However, this perception is not shared by Syrian refugees.⁵¹ Also, complaints about Syrian refugees seem

³⁶ *A resilience-based development response to the Syria crisis*, UNDG (2014) p. 11

³⁷ World Bank (2015): <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/overview>

³⁸ “Between Local Patronage Relationships and Securitization: The Conflict Context in the Bekaa Region”, *Conflict Analysis Report, January 2015*, UNDP/Lebanon Support (2015), p. 16; see also *Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, UNDP (2016), p. 28

³⁹ “Between Local Patronage Relationships and Securitization: The Conflict Context in the Bekaa Region”, *Conflict Analysis Report, January 2015*, UNDP/Lebanon Support (2015), p. 27

⁴⁰ *Informal Hybrid Security in Lebanon*, Lebanon Support (2016), pp. 24-25

⁴¹ *The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon, A Conflict Analysis*, Norwegian Church Aid (2015), p. 8

⁴² *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, UNDP (2016), p. 62. See also *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, International Alert* (2016). The main security and justice issues of Syrian refugees relate to registration/documentation, family, as well as rental contracts and work permits

⁴³ Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published); and LAU and *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, International Alert* (2016).

⁴⁴ *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, International Alert* (2016).

⁴⁵ for cases that are not related to their legal status (illegal entry, illegal residence and forged papers are consider crimes in Lebanon) – Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

⁴⁶ *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, International Alert* (2016)

⁴⁷ *The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon, A Conflict Analysis, Norwegian Church Aid* (2015), p. 6. Local religious leaders are most trusted by the youngest (15-30) and the oldest (61-75) segments of the population (Ibid).

⁴⁸ *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, International Alert* (2016)

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *The Social Stability Context in the Nabatieh & Bint Jbeil Qazas* (UNDP), 2016

⁵¹ Less than a fifth of Syrian refugees make that assessment (*The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon, A Conflict Analysis*,

to result from perceptions rather than evidence-based situations.⁵² Major security incidents are said to influence significantly the perceptions of Syrian refugees by host communities at national level.⁵³ Also, it is worth noting that while the arrival of refugees may have fuelled perceptions of insecurity within the population, only 40% of the respondents reported feeling safe in their areas before the arrival of Syrian refugees.⁵⁴ Besides, crime rates for the general population have not increased beyond what can be accounted for by the increased population since the arrival of Syrian refugees.⁵⁵ In other terms, perceptions of insecurity and tensions should be analysed carefully. It is not so much the raw than the disaggregated data and the time of their collection that inform on potential tensions and trends.

- While local conditions first shape security perceptions, negative perceptions towards Syrian refugees are driven by national considerations rather than local issues: Security perceptions seem to be influenced by local conditions rather than the community's predominant political and sectarian affiliations.⁵⁶ This means perceptions of safety vary according to regions.⁵⁷ Perceptions seem to change significantly when respondents are asked about threats to sectarian balance in their region and Lebanon as whole. Only 30% of respondents consider Syrian refugees to be a direct risk in their own area regarding the sectarian balance; but 51% of respondents considered the Syrian presence to pose a threat to the sectarian balance at national level.⁵⁸ Likewise, while only 23% of respondents perceive Syrian refugees as a direct threat to their personal economy; 74% of respondents said Syrians pose a risk to other Lebanese citizens.⁵⁹ These figures are confirmed, *a contrario*, by the perceptions surveys conducted by UNDP Host Communities Project, whereby the impact of the Syrian crisis on local conditions is rated very negatively despite those very same local conditions are being assessed as "improving" by the same respondents.⁶⁰
- Some categories of the population feel more threatened than others by the presence of Syrian refugees: Younger respondents report being worried more than older generations; women seem slightly less concerned than men; newly employed and unemployed feel more affected by Syrian competition in the labour market than those with more secure employment. Respondents who regularly vote for the same political party tend to feel more economically threatened than merit voters. While merit voters tend to blame local factors; dogmatic voters generally blame Syrian refugees. Interfaith families and non-regular voters report less perception of insecurity; Respondents' with a lesser level of income and education feel less economically threatened by the Syrian presence.⁶¹
- Public perceptions seem to be shaped mainly by TV and radio; with printed press, religious leaders, social media and word of mouth being second (political leaders and NGOs are reportedly less mentioned as a source of information).⁶² The printed press has allegedly a tendency to overemphasis crime stories involving Syrians.⁶³

Norwegian Church Aid (2015), p. 6)

⁵² *Converging Interests of Conciliation: the social stability context in the Marjaayoun and Hasbay Qazas* (UNDP), 2016

⁵³ Lebanon was struck by major security incidents in 2014 and 2015, such as the suicide-bombings in Beirut and heavy shelling in Baalbek; a bomb set to explode was also discovered in Aakar.

⁵⁴ *Citizens' perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 3

⁵⁵ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016), p. 29

⁵⁶ *Citizens' perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), pp. 3-5. This finding is confirmed by another International Alert study demonstrating that differences in trust of security institutions are far more distinguishable by district and province than confessional group (*Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 4).

⁵⁷ While sectarian tensions may be perceived as an issue of importance in Beqaa region, in the North province the main concerns seem to relate to petty and organised crimes – *Citizens' perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 3

⁵⁸ *Citizens' perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 4

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Setting Baselines and Measuring Change: the Host Communities Projects – UNDP Lebanon* (2015), p. 22

⁶¹ References for the paragraph: Cf. *Citizens' perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), pp. 3-4

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 7

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 8

Recent surveys indicate increased tensions between host communities and Syrian Refugees:

The arrival of Syrian refugees generated tensions in host communities. The tensions are linked to overall livelihoods and development challenges (pressures on housing, jobs and local infrastructures); concrete security incidents and human rights violations; but also to perceptions. Intergroup conflicts are still relatively minor issues and mostly manifest in low levels incidents, attacks, harassment and repression (curfew, etc). Instances of violent confrontation are sporadic and localised, usually linked to crimes and offences for which Syrians are being blamed by Lebanese residents.⁶⁴ While the presence of Syrian refugees is increasingly less perceived as a direct security threat to host communities, the persistence of the crisis is expected to aggravate negative perceptions.⁶⁵ Most recent perception surveys point out to increasing feelings of tension between refugees and host communities.⁶⁶ Such increase is related to the fact that Lebanese tended to perceive initially the Syrian refugee presence as temporary.⁶⁷ With the Syrian crisis entering its seventh year, the presence of Syrian refugees begins to aggravate tensions over the competition for jobs and livelihoods.⁶⁸ The political calendar, such as elections, impacts as well tensions at local level. A great source of concern in recent surveys is the increased number of respondents seeking to defend their interests and a decrease of those promoting dialogue in most communities. Those figures indicate growing tensions and decreased social stability within the communities, and the increased likelihood this will lead to negative action. This situation could create conditions for people to use more violent or isolating means to “take matters into their own hands”, particularly when considering the high number of respondents who feel powerless to affect change in their communities, and who see themselves as increasingly competing with the refugee population⁶⁹

Most vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees are victims of human rights violations that have a negative impact on the local social fabric and national stability

Most vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian refugees are most at risk of human rights violations when they are in contact with rule of law institutions. The most vulnerable Lebanese face similar issues as those faced by the most vulnerable in many countries. They are disproportionately affected and impacted by pretrial detention, notably because of their lack of access to legal counsel.⁷⁰ As a matter of fact, a large number of pretrial detainees are reportedly in custody for minor cases.⁷¹ As regards Syrian refugees, their vulnerability to rule of law institution relates to the insecurity implied by their legal status.⁷² Restrictions on entry into Lebanon, increased controls over residency, and a tighter definition of who is a refugee has resulted into increased number of illegal entries, illegal residences and forged papers which are all consider crimes in Lebanon.⁷³ Human rights abuses include reported instances of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which are most likely to occur during the initial detention and interrogation by the ISF or other security actors with judicial police authority⁷⁴. The large use of pre-trial detention for minor crimes (pre-trial detention rate amounts to at least 60%) increases the likelihood of such abuses.⁷⁵ In the view of

⁶⁴ *The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon, A Conflict Analysis*, Norwegian Church Aid (2015), p. 5

⁶⁵ “Looking at non-services, it appears that security is becoming less of a concern, while employment remains an issue that people consistently, and increasingly, raise in their stories” – *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 13

⁶⁶ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 67. This is the case of the North and the Bekaa that were the focus of the study; but can be said from other regions, such as Mount-Lebanon.

⁶⁷ *Citizens’ perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 4

⁶⁸ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 59

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 76

⁷⁰ *The Socio-economic Impact of Pretrial Detention*, UNDP/OSJI, 2010. There is no specific study on access to justice challenges for the most vulnerable in Lebanon.

⁷¹ Interviews with representatives of the justice sector

⁷² Especially since the adoption by the Government of Lebanon of the “Syrian Refugees Policy Paper” in October 2014

⁷³ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016), p. 29; and *The Social Stability Context in the Nabatieh & Bint Jbeil Qazas* (UNDP), 2016, p. 13

⁷⁴ UN Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (9/2/2010) *Compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 – Lebanon*, p.6; UN Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (8/13/2015) *Compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex to Council resolution 16/21 – Lebanon*, p.8.

⁷⁵ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016), p. 84

the Committee against Torture as of 2013-2014, “the conditions of detentions could be described as cruel, inhuman and degrading and even amounting to torture in some cases”.⁷⁶ There is a concern with overcrowding of prisons and serious human rights violations happening in detention centres as detainees are a risk-group for violent extremism in Lebanon.⁷⁷

The use of excessive and performative force by security agents, notably municipal police, in their raids on informal settlements of Syrian refugees is increasing the feelings of indignation towards the Lebanese authorities and could contribute to greater support for militant groups.⁷⁸ Serious human rights violations are indeed a demonstrated factor contributing to violent extremism.⁷⁹ Serious human rights violations targeting Syrian refugees by security and justice institutions present also the risk of generalizing malpractices and misconducts within rule of law institutions in the medium-run and weakening the rule of law for national Lebanese consequently.

UNDERLYING AND ROOTCAUSES

Lebanon history of violent conflicts, political instability has severely weakened Rule of Law institutions:

While the Project operates in the context of the Syrian Crisis and the resultant influx of over one million Syrian refugees, Lebanon has long faced violent conflicts and political instability. The country has been beset by civil war (1975-1990), regional proxy wars (including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), presence of Syrian army (1976-2005), and political violence. The country is also marked by the presence of 450,000 Palestinian refugees since its independence in 1943. This history of violence and instability left the Lebanese with a memory of mistreatment of civilians and abuse by the State; the prominence of sectarian and political divisions at both political and social levels; and weak rule of law institutions. As a result of the cycles of violence since 1975, the absence of reform of security institutions as initially envisaged in the 1989 Taif Agreement, and the Syrian presence, state institutions have been marginalised and non-state actors have played a large role in security provision since the civil war.⁸⁰ The Syrian presence notably meant that Syrian troops were in charge of internal security instead of the ISF. The same diagnosis can be made for the justice sector. The absence of transitional justice process affected the legitimacy and credibility of justice institutions; and encouraged individuals to take justice matters into their own hands.⁸¹ Political instability increased in recent years, for instance with Parliament not having passed a budget since 2005 and Lebanon not having had a President from May 2014 to October 2016. The absence of legislative activity and strong executive makes reforming rule of law institution very challenging if not impossible at national level. It also prevents rule of law institutions to have a yearly budget that they can plan (budget follows the “twelve month rule”). The limited political will for significant reform of the security and justice sector or to promote strict operational compliance with human rights standards contributes to a generally slow pace of change and limited sustainability of some donors’ interventions. As regards the Syrian crisis, current Government efforts to promote stability have been very important but need to be further developed. The country has a national strategy to cope with the Syrian crisis.⁸² However LCRP programming for rule of law institutions is

⁷⁶ *Report of the Committee against Torture*, Annex XIII “Summary account of the results of the proceedings concerning the inquiry on Lebanon”, A/69/44 (2013-2014), para. 35

⁷⁷ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016), pp. 121-122. Interviews conducted in the framework of UNDP’s Community Security and Access to Justice Project’s Rule of Law Assessment indicated that as of 2016 in Lebanon between 600 and 700 persons are currently detained based on terrorism charges

⁷⁸ On the use of excessive force, see *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016), pp. 23; 28 and 49. On the increased feeling of indignation, see *Between Local Patronage Relationships and Securitization: The Conflict Context in the Bekaa Region. Conflict Analysis Report*, Lebanon Support/UNDP (2015); Human Rights Watch (2015) *World Report 2015: Lebanon*; Human Rights Watch (10/3/2014) *Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugees. Some Appear to Be Retaliation for August Clashes, Executions* (2014).

⁷⁹ Cf. *Global Terrorism Index 2014, Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, Institute for Economics and Peace (2014)

⁸⁰ *Failing to Deal with the Past, What Cost to Lebanon?*, ICTJ (2014), pp. 29-30.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31

⁸² Cf. Lebanese Crisis Response Plan. The LCRP is designed to: 1) Ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for the most vulnerable among persons displaced from Syria and poorest Lebanese; 2) Strengthen the capacity of national and local service delivery systems to expand access to and quality of basic public services; and 3) Reinforce Lebanon’s economic, social, environmental, and institutional stability.

still modest, hampering those institutions to respond to challenges on the ground. The weak legal status of refugees in Lebanon makes the response of rule of law institutions to the crisis even more challenging.⁸³

Cross dynamics of sectarian politics and regional interference have particularly weakened the state and rule of law institutions: While political movements are taking steps to prevent sectarian tensions from spinning out of control, the notion that Lebanon can be insulated from the effects of the Syrian crisis is considered as fanciful. Past conflicts demonstrate how proxy wars and external interference, whether instrumentalised or suffered by national actors, have impacted sectarian geopolitics, spatial positioning and overall political stability in Lebanon.⁸⁴ While “sectarian power struggle has driven sects to seek foreign backing and support in order to balance against one another, foreign players have been active in supporting their respective allies to achieve advantageous geo-strategic positions [in the region]”.⁸⁵ In other terms, while the Syrian conflict can be seen as an extension of Lebanese own internal conflicts, it exposes the country at the mercy of external interference – “how much precisely Syria’s evolution will affect Lebanon is not certain, but the short answer is: a lot”.⁸⁶

Another root cause of lack of justice and security services and increased tensions in host communities is poverty and inequalities affecting those communities and their lack of social capital. More than a quarter of Lebanese live in poverty. National poverty rates mask regional disparities between Beirut (where rates are insignificant), the South (42 percent), and the North (52 percent) that host large numbers of Syrian Refugees.⁸⁷ Poor Lebanese households struggle with managing their expenses in light of the stagnation of their incomes and the increase in prices of essential commodities.⁸⁸ In general, the awareness about their rights and information about government-implemented protection programmes is low among poor households; in particular among women from poor households.⁸⁹ Income poverty impacts heavily social marginalization⁹⁰ that is detrimental to access informal justice and security services.

Syrian refugees that do not have legal documents cannot claim their rights. Encountering curfews or checkpoints, or reporting a crime at a police station, carries a risk of discovery of any unlawful residence or entry, and the imposition in late 2014 of new laws on entry and residence have made regularization more difficult.⁹¹ As a result, Syrian refugees avoid being in contact with law enforcement institutions, even when they are victims of an offense or a crime, for fear of being deported.⁹² Syrian refugees also have a limited social capital, making it difficult for them to access to informal networks that can bring justice and security responses to their grievances.⁹³ The situation is aggravated by the shortage of leaders within their communities;⁹⁴ and the practice not to resort to formal rule of law institutions in their home-country.⁹⁵

⁸³ Lebanon is not a state party to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Therefore, due to the various positions among different political powers on being for or against the current Syrian regime, Lebanon’s not being a state party to the 1951 Convention was used as a pretext to consider Syrians as “displaced” persons rather than refugees, with resultant negative effects on the levels of protection provided to Syrians; and lack of clarity over policies for their settlements in “host communities”.

⁸⁴ See Imad Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 14, Number 2 (2009)

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92

⁸⁶ *A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian conflict*, International Crisis Group (2012), p. ii

⁸⁷ *UNDP Country Programme for Lebanon*. Nabatieh, Beka’a, South Lebanon and North Lebanon are the most deprived. Mount Lebanon is the least deprived governorate in the country, with Beirut.

⁸⁸ *Poverty, Inequality and Social Protection in Lebanon*, Oxfam/AUB (2016), p. 12

https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/publications/Documents/research_reports/20160426_poverty_inequality.pdf

⁸⁹ *Poverty, Inequality and Social Protection in Lebanon*, Oxfam/AUB (2016), p. 8

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ Bobseine, Haley (2016) “I just wanted to be treated like a person”. *How Lebanon's residency rules facilitate abuse of Syrian refugees*, Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/lebanon0116web.pdf

⁹² Such cases are regularly documented by humanitarian actors.

⁹³ Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

⁹⁴ *The Syrian Crisis and its Impact on Lebanon, A Conflict Analysis*, Norwegian Church Aid (2015), p. 6

⁹⁵ LAU Survey, not published yet (Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos.

Woman-headed households across nationalities i.e. Lebanese and Syrian are most vulnerable to poverty. Gender parity is a slow moving process due to deeply embedded socio-cultural and legal constraints, and unequal personal status laws, low female representation in parliament (only 4 women out of 128), and the absence of women in the labour force (only 25 percent are gainfully employed).⁹⁶

The Syrian Crisis has a profound socio-economic, political and security impact at local and national level:

The high numbers of refugees are putting significant additional pressure on the capacity of the central and local governments, and civil society organisations (CSOs) to respond to refugee and host community security and justice measures, and to mitigate inter-communal tensions and conflicts. In areas with a large presence of Syrian refugees, demand for basic services continues to far outstrip the capacity of institutions and infrastructure to meet needs. Tensions and lack of access to essential services are intensifying fastest as the large numbers of displaced Syrians coincide with a pre-crisis history of weak service delivery for the local population, making these areas the highest priority for support.⁹⁷ There are significant tensions between and within Syrian refugee and Lebanese host communities influenced by relative social and economic conditions, and driven by increased competition for scarce social services. The influx of Syrian refugees since 2011/12 exacerbated the stress on the livelihood systems of poor households by way of increased competition for jobs. Being in informal and semi-skilled jobs, the poor Lebanese households face competition from the refugee population who are themselves in an extremely vulnerable situation.

The crisis in Syria casts also its shadow on the political and social scene in Lebanon. A political rift rapidly appeared based on groups' respective position towards the Syria crisis wherein some political and armed groups joined the fighting in Syria whether in support of the Syrian regime or as opposing forces. In other terms, the crisis in Syria is further polarizing the political scene and contribute to the protracted political crisis at national level. The ability of dominant political forces to control their respective and increasingly polarised constituencies is reportedly declining.⁹⁸ If proved, this trend could lead some to take matters into their own hands, "reviving [a] militia culture" that further feeds insecurity feelings across the country.⁹⁹

The Syrian crisis is notably exacerbating pre-existing challenges of Rule of Law institutions:

Security institutions do not have a culture of service-delivery and are crippled by sectarian issues: While the Internal Security Forces¹⁰⁰ (police) benefit some degree of support that transcends sectarian cleavages, the formal security sector is characterised by multiple authorities and legal ambiguities which contribute to weaken its performance since before the Syrian crisis.¹⁰¹ The Lebanese power-sharing system has emphasised the role of sectarianism and exacerbated clientelism in the provision of security and justice at local level.¹⁰² The lack of specific strategy for Rule of Law institutions in dealing with the Syrian crisis may reinforce centrifugal forces at local level, notably the non-state actors of the security sector. Those include notably armed wings of sectarian-based political parties as well as a range of semi-sectarian civil society actors, families, clans and tribes and the private sector.¹⁰³ Likewise, the militarization of the ISF and consequent lack of culture of service delivery makes it difficult for security forces to be in touch with local population concerns in relation to the Syrian crisis and to respond to those in a way that appease tensions and prevent conflicts.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁶ UNDP Lebanon Gender Strategy, January 2016.

⁹⁷ See LCRP, notably section 2.2 Gaps in Essential Services. See also Harb, C, & Saab, R. (2014) *Social Cohesion and CLI assessment – Save the Children report*, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=5807>

⁹⁸ *A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian conflict*, International Crisis Group (2012), p. 27. Part of the explanation is allegedly to be found in the parties' prioritization of internal cohesion over discipline at a time of heightened threat (Ibid.)

⁹⁹ *A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian conflict*, International Crisis Group (2012), p. 25

¹⁰⁰ The state security apparatus is made of six agencies. The other agencies are: The five other agencies are: Lebanese Armed Forces, General Security Directorate, State Security Directorate, Civil Defense and Lebanese Customs Administration.

¹⁰¹ *Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 3

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 2

¹⁰⁴ The ISF are militarized, with its officers having been educated at the Military Academy; and its personnel holding military ranks, generally wearing a military-style (blue camouflage) uniform (though non-military style uniforms are now increasingly being worn by a minority of police), and often carrying assault rifles – Cf. *Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, UNDP (2016), p. 34

The Syrian crisis has further deteriorated the already inadequate resources of justice and security institutions: Lebanese security and justice institutions all suffer from inadequate resourcing by the Government including receiving insufficient budgets, human resources, infrastructure and equipment. The courts in particular are still dealing with a historical backlog of cases that was the product of years of conflict during which fewer cases could be tried. Many old cases remain, particularly regarding property issues.¹⁰⁵ Lebanese security and justice agencies have not generally received significant additional resources to cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. While the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities was able to increase the number of police forces; it has no resources left for investments to improve its strategic and operational capacities to respond to the Syrian crisis. The Ministry of Justice does not have a strategy to respond to the specific needs resulting from the Syrian crisis either. The lack of national strategy to address the Syrian crisis make the accessibility to justice services or coping strategies, such as reduction of delay in criminal and civil courts, even more challenging. The large number of Syrian Refugees in detention has further deteriorated the judicial caseload by 35-40% with no increase in the number of judges;¹⁰⁶ while overcrowding of prisons with pretrial detention rate has increased from 40% to 60%.¹⁰⁷ These factors are *root causes* of weak delivery of security and justice services to the population and a limited ability of many, particularly host communities and Syrian refugees, to meaningfully assert their rights.

IMMEDIATE CAUSES:

A challenged legal framework and the absence of management systems and operational procedures within the Municipal Police fragment Rule of Law institutions responsiveness: The gaps and ambiguities in the legal framework on the duties of municipal police in providing, as a first responder, safety and security services to communities creates tensions with the ISF. While the Municipal Law and the Criminal Procedure Code provide the legislative framework for municipal policing, there is a lack of clear guidance as to the scope and nature of the work or legal authority of municipal police. Likewise, the absence of standard operating procedures (SOPs) to govern the work of municipal police makes the governance of those forces by municipalities and ISF challenging; while hampering their efficiency on the ground. The law is interpreted differently by the municipalities and the ISF, conducting to tensions between those institutions, notably regarding the authority of judicial police of mayors, and to incidents between ISF and municipal police on the grounds.¹⁰⁸ Overall there is a lack of training, SOP and systems to structure the municipal police and articulating its work with other institutions – ISF, District and Governorates authorities. Human resources are managed on an *ad hoc* basis; there are no specific procedures for recruitment, advancement or discipline. Likewise, there are very few accountability lines and oversight mechanisms, internally and externally. The municipal police is very much a security force at the service of the mayor. This creates tensions between municipal police forces and mayors.

Overstretched ISF and justice institutions at local level coupled with institutional weakness correlates with the surge of informal actors: ISF cannot always cover all localities due to its limited geographical coverage and human resources to respond to demands from individuals.¹⁰⁹ A number of mayors expressed lack of confidence in the efficiency or responsiveness of the ISF.¹¹⁰ The ISF suffers notably from outdated regulations and organization where promotion is based upon seniority rather than merit.¹¹¹ As a result of this relative absence of ISF at local level, the number of informal security providers increased. They are “re-emerging

¹⁰⁵ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, UNDP (2016), p. 70

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 69

¹⁰⁷ Figures provided by international actors working with prisons authorities.

¹⁰⁸ There have even been cases of municipal police having been arrested by the ISF while going about their legitimate duties – *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment* (2016), p. 43

¹⁰⁹ *Informal Hybrid Security in Lebanon*, Lebanon Support (2016), pp. 22-23

¹¹⁰ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, UNDP (2016), p. 36

¹¹¹ Christelle Samaha, “Security Sector Reform in Lebanon – Case Study: Women in the ISF”, MA Thesis (unpublished), Lebanese American University, January 2013, p. 20

actors” (such as local notables, former militiamen, or leaders of political parties), or new actors, such as private security companies and individuals/groups that take initiatives on their own.¹¹²

The same can be said for justice institutions. Most Lebanese do not have access to legal aid while courts suffer from major delays. Delays affects particularly the civil courts, mainly because of the relative complexity of many civil cases.¹¹³ Criminal courts are subjected to pressure – “external and undue influence is commonly exerted in criminal cases”.¹¹⁴

The insufficient articulation and coordination among rule of law actors prevents service delivery: (i) Municipalities authorities and central rule of law institutions insufficiently share information and coordinate their response regarding local security issues and conflicts; (ii) Municipal police and ISF do not always share the same understanding on their respective missions and tasks; (iii) justice, security and protection actors do not communicate enough to address circumstantial and systemic gaps and bottlenecks; (iv) there is insufficient articulation between formal and informal actors at local level; (v) and there is a lack of dialogue between Syrian refugees and Lebanese authorities.

Limited oversight of criminal justice institutions increases the likelihood of human rights abuses for detainees: There is limited judicial oversight over pre-trial detention in many cases and detainees are not permitted to access a lawyer during the early stages of detention, including during the initial interrogation by police or other security forces. Prosecutor numbers remaining particularly low given the high demands placed on them to oversee investigations, monitor detention places and present cases in the courts. Prisons and detention centres are mostly not “fit for purpose” as correctional facilities, lack rehabilitation and reintegration services for adults, and are managed by non-specialist police officers rather than by a professional prison service under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. These facilities generally lack civil society monitoring and oversight mechanisms. Most of the staff in prisons and detention lack gender sensitivity and understanding of minimum standards and rules, due to limited trainings.

Data are insufficient and insufficiently used to inform on host communities needs and local tensions: While the ISF collect data on criminal cases, those data are not harmonised at national level within security forces and with the Ministry of Justice, making it difficult to use them for prevention purposes. Data are rarely published nor made available to larger audiences than the respective security and justice institutions. The ISF does not collect data aside from criminal cases. Local security incidents and tensions are not properly registered. Lots of data are generated by non-state actors consequently.

There is insufficient counter-narrative to address negative perceptions over Syrian refugees: Host community tend to have negative perceptions of Syrian refugees. They perceive Syrian refugees as engaged in criminal activities; competing over their jobs and worsening their access to local services and infrastructure; but also benefiting from humanitarian aid that excludes poor Lebanese. A number of peacebuilding efforts are under way to address those perceptions. However, important efforts still need to be done to address misperceptions of Syrian refugees. Civil society in particular is considered as too shy and does not counter the narrative of politicians.¹¹⁵

Against this background, it is critical to respond to the outlined development challenge especially given that Lebanon faces a protracted conflict context and the legacy – exacerbated by a lack of a meaningful transitional justice process – of the various crises it has faced over the last four decades. The crisis in Syria along with the unprecedented high number of refugees call for strong action to prevent crisis and at the same time strengthen resilience and social stability.

¹¹² *Informal Hybrid Security in Lebanon*, Lebanon Support (2016), pp. 24-25

¹¹³ *Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, UNDP (2016), p. 70

¹¹⁴ American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Institute (2012), quoted by *Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, UNDP (2016), p. 72

¹¹⁵ Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

II. STRATEGY

Theory of Change: By (i) developing basic security and justice services for host communities and vulnerable groups in municipalities; (ii) developing the capacities of MoI and MoJ to support municipal police and legal help desks; (iii) establishing platforms to deal with security and justice issues among state actors, as well as between formal and informal actors; (iv) developing capacities of national state institutions to understand and respond to local security, justice and human rights challenges; and (v) developing a people-centred culture in security and justice institutions: tensions and conflicts between host communities and Syrian refugees will decrease while building blocks for positive resilience and improved social fabric will be laid.

Summary of the Strategy

The project acknowledges the importance of responding to both concrete security needs and perceptions of insecurity, and will support national partners to address both challenges. The project will develop capacities of state institutions as there is a need to have strengthened and responsive state institutions in the short-, medium- and long-term. The project will develop a mix of service provision and communication/awareness activities in order to address both perceptions of insecurity and concrete security issues and injustices faced by host communities.¹¹⁶ The project will work with both formal and informal institutions since the population get access to justice and security services through such a mix; and will focus on articulating those institutions with a focus on the “state-backbone”, starting from the municipalities up to district/governorate and the Ministries. The project will work mainly at municipality level since it is where security issues of the population arise and actors can address those concerns; it will also involve governorate and central institutions in order to reengage central institutions in the response to local conflicts and the support to municipal capacities.

Service Delivery Approach: The project will work through a service delivery approach. This will enable to improve efficiency of institutions and address the needs of the population, whether they are real or perceived. Such approach is people-centred and is based on the redefinition of security by the landmark 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP), successful experience on community security in a number of countries;¹¹⁷ and Access to Justice and legal empowerment of the Poor initiatives worldwide.¹¹⁸

- **Improve Efficiency & Responsiveness of State Institutions:** Supporting a service delivery approach will enable municipal police to focus on its core functions. It will also transform ISF and deconcentrated institutions into a resource for municipalities and improve the management and oversight of municipal police work consequently. In particular, it will enable (i) ISF to be a resource centre for the municipal police, in the areas of human resources (including through training and coaching); and (ii) governorate and district authorities to organise a response to early warnings detected by security cells.
- **Respond to Concrete Needs & Address Perceptions of Insecurity:** As the municipality will improve service delivery, residents shall feel increasingly more engaged and in control of the situation in their community, encouraging further ownership and positive interactions within and with municipalities.¹¹⁹ Perception of safety depends on the presence of security institutions. There is reportedly a perception that the mere presence of an ISF station could deter crime.¹²⁰ Likewise, any intervention is reportedly appreciated by Syrian Refugees. Even those that do not bring satisfying outcomes are valued as Syrian refugees feel empowered by them.¹²¹ Supporting municipalities to provide security and justice services will improve the opinion towards them and have a positive impact on social stability, as demonstrated by surveys on the municipalities conducted by UNDP in 2015.¹²²

¹¹⁶ *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, International Alert (2016)

¹¹⁷ Cf. notably *La gouvernance locale de la police et les conseils locaux de sécurité, Etude comparée de cas*, UNDP (2011)


¹¹⁸ Cf. notably *Legal Aid Service Provision*, UNDP (2016); *Legal Empowerment of the Poor and Eradication of Poverty*, United Nations (2009)A/64/133

¹¹⁹ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 52

¹²⁰ *Citizens' Perceptions of Security Institutions in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 11

¹²¹ *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, International Alert (2016)

¹²² *Setting Baselines and Measuring Change: the Host Communities Projects – UNDP Lebanon* (2015), pp. 6; 21



1. DELIVERING SECURITY AND JUSTICE SERVICES AT MUNICIPAL LEVEL

1.1 DEVELOP COMMUNITY SECURITY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE SERVICES IN PILOT LOCATIONS

PROFESSIONALISATION OF MUNICIPAL POLICE

Institutionalising the municipal police is requested by the members and heads of the Municipal Police, as well as mayors.¹²³ Such institutionalisation will enable the municipal police to focus on its administrative and social functions. It will professionalise the municipal police forces and reduce their exposure to “political interference”. Professionalising and institutionalizing the municipal police will be achieved through the implementation of SOPs, improved human resources management, trainings/coaching and provision of basic equipment. Such support will enable to rationalize the use of force at municipal level, improve checks and balances, as well as the complementarity between municipal police and ISF.

IMPROVE SERVICE DELIVERY OF ISF PILOT STATIONS

The project will renovate and train the ISF Gendarmerie of the pilot stations to respond to requests for interventions; and perform their “coaching function” of municipal police at local level. Rehabilitation will include basic renovation, provision of one vehicle per pilot station, IT and office equipment to treat and respond to demands. The training will be provided by the ISF Academy. It will include the production of manuals and other didactic and communication tools to implement community policing approach by the ISF police station, jointly with municipal police. The project will also support the ISF pilot stations to better manage their operational/administrative activities, in liaison with the ISF Central Command.

ESTABLISH LEGAL HELP-DESKS

The project will support the Ministry of Justice and justice institutions, including the Bar Association, to provide legal assistance to host communities since today such aid is mainly provided to Syrian refugees. The project will support the MoJ to develop a “hybrid civil legal assistance system” to develop legal assistance services to host communities through NGOs. The project will support union of municipalities’ authorities to establish legal help-desks that will (i) sensitise host communities and Syrian refugees on their rights and orient them to access to relevant administrative and social state services; (ii) provide mediation for small dispute; (iii) and organise referral to other state and non-state institutions. Such system will be established by municipal/district authorities and be run on a daily basis by civil society organizations. The establishment of the legal help-desks will transform the municipalities into a service-provider for tackling daily injustices and will articulate informal with formal institutions. The focus on legal helpdesks will respond to the expectation of the population that puts legal equality, notably across religions and sects, as the first priority in the area of justice.¹²⁴ As demonstrated by UNDP access to justice programmes and overall legal empowerment experience in a number of countries worldwide, for the most vulnerable, legal assistance can rebalance the asymmetry in awareness, knowledge and resources to take advantage of the law; be an efficient response to their legal and social needs; and create thereby a trusted interface between rule of law institutions that prove often distant to populations and vulnerable groups in particular.¹²⁵

IMPROVE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION

The project will support measures to address the population at risk in prison. Those will involve short-term measures and longer-term initiatives such as, improving detention condition, supporting the provision of legal aid to detainees, and developing social reintegration measures. Those measures will contribute to respond to violent radicalisation in prisons; and alleviate the socio-economic impact of detention for the detainees that is heavily felt among the most disadvantaged.

¹²³ Cf. Summaries of UNDP regional workshops held in Baalbek, South Lebanon and Nabatieh, Beeka, North, Akkar; and Mount Lebanon (unpublished).

¹²⁴ *How Lebanon talk about the Lebanon Wars, A Study of the Perceptions and Expectations of Residents in Greater Beirut*, ICTJ (2014), p. 28. (Ibid).

¹²⁵ See notably *Legal Empowerment Strategies at Work, Lessons in Inclusion from Country Experiences*, UNDP, 2014; *The Socio-economic Impact of Pretrial Detention*, UNDP/OSJI, 2010; *Legal Aid Service Provision, A How-To Guide on Legal Aid Programming in Africa*, UNDP, 2016

1.2 STRENGTHEN CENTRAL CAPACITIES FOR MUNICIPAL POLICE AND LEGAL HELP DESKS

The project will support minimal capacities for the governorate/district authorities, ISF and MoIM/MOJ at central level in order to beef up municipalities' efforts in the area of security and justice and ensure access to security and justice of the most vulnerable at local level. The project will improve analysis of security challenges in municipalities, support an early responses capacities to the most pressing security needs, and improve efficiency and accountability of municipal police. The project will also support MoJ to lay the institutional foundations for legal aid services for host communities, including the design and oversight of legal assistance provided by NGOs¹²⁶; and MoIM to address basic needs of population at risk in prisons.

Transforming MoIM and ISF as a resources centre for training and coaching of municipal police: The project will support the MoIM and ISF at central level to be a resources-centre for training and coaching municipal police, and for improving human resources management of municipal polices. In particular, the project will support the MoIM and ISF to develop the necessary tools to implement SOPs across all municipalities. The project will work closely with the ISF Academy in the areas of training and coaching.

Supporting Ministry of Justice to ensure Quality Assurance of Legal Aid: the project will work with the Ministry of Justice in order to develop a harmonized curriculum for paralegals; and organised the trainings of paralegals. The project will support the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) efforts to develop a status for paralegals as those currently working for Syrian refugees are not always recognised by institutions.¹²⁷ The project will also support the MoJ to perform its quality assurance role for legal assistance provided at local level.

1.3 SUPPORT INCLUSIVE PLATFORMS

The project will support the establishment of inclusive platforms and networks gathering (i) state and non-state actors; (ii) Governorate/District authorities, ISF, municipal police and municipalities; as well as (iii) social groups within host communities and Syrian refugees. Articulating state and non-state actors is crucial as informal actors and networks play a crucial role in the provision of justice and security services. Likewise, integrative mechanisms are critical to cope with fast changing demographics in host communities.¹²⁸

- “Municipality led Community Security Platforms” – involving the population on security matters: The project will support municipalities to organise “community security platforms” in order to (i) gather all groups and institutions concerned and/or in charge of security issues, including civil society; (ii) identify security issues of concern for the population; (iii) produce and implement local security initiatives.

Equipping municipalities with such analytical and response plans is critical as studies demonstrated that responsiveness of municipalities is a matter of planning and good management rather than a resources issue.¹²⁹ Besides, people appear to increasingly feel the need to be better represented by the municipal government, and to be part of more inclusive communication and discussion at the planning stage of projects or initiatives.¹³⁰ The committees will be led by municipal authorities.¹³¹ They will include relevant central and municipal services, such as ISF and municipal police, as well as civil society. The community security platforms will enable to have a comprehensive approach to security. Such approach is all the more necessary as in the most serious security incidents affecting Syrian refugees and host communities, several causes were at play.¹³²

¹²⁶ Such involvement is crucial as legal aid currently provided through NGOs is not overseen by justice institutions

¹²⁷ Meeting with Caritas, 20 October 2016

¹²⁸ Imad Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options”, *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Volume 14, Number 2 (2009), p. 95

¹²⁹ Cf. *About Administrative Decentralization in Lebanon*, p. 14, LCPS (2015)

¹³⁰ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 44

¹³¹ As well as Unions of Municipalities when relevant

¹³² *Converging Interests of Conciliation: the social stability context in the Marjaayoun and Hasbay Qazas* (UNDP), 2016

The platforms will enable national institutions to be more in tune with local challenges; and local authorities to table issues of regional/national importance. The methodology used by district community security platforms to identify and address security issues will enable to improve dialogue among social groups and address misperceptions regarding the security impact of Syrian refugees. Such platform is utmost needed as most recent perception surveys demonstrate that respondents promoting dialogue have decreased in most communities in favor of respondents seeking to defend their interests, indicating growing tensions and decreased social stability within the communities and increased likelihood this will lead to negative action.¹³³ The project will build on existing practice when available. Existing local security coordination committees at district level are noted as very useful to diffuse tensions, as well as solve and prevent conflicts.¹³⁴ The main reason is that they include key stakeholders, notably the governor office and political parties; enable to coordinate security local policies and actions; and have a broad human-rights based approach to security, encompassing social and humanitarian aspects.

Community security platforms will also enable municipalities and their population to “feel in control” of their security challenges by identifying jointly security issues and developing solutions. The need to be “in control” seems to be indeed a major concern within host communities.¹³⁵ Local community security committees will also inform, through the district and central security cell, national policies, for the drivers for tensions/conflicts are national policies rather than social attitudes at local level.¹³⁶

- Articulating the various administrative levels – District Security Cells 2.0: The project will support the District Security Cells to better articulate the various administrative levels – from municipalities to Ministry of Interior in order to improve the state response to security and justice challenges. Such articulation will improve the complementarity and responsiveness of institutions in charge of security. Coordination mechanisms and tools will also improve the accountability of municipal police requested by both mayors and district/governorate authorities.

Supporting such articulation responds to the expectation of host communities. Although the municipality continues to be seen as the source most responsible for improving service provision, there is a growing trend of people who place responsibility on the central government as well.¹³⁷ Also, there is a need for the various security forces to work in a complementary manner rather than current the “zero-sum-game” approach that seems to prevail in a number of municipalities.

For that purpose the project will support exchanges among institutions in charge of security, notably: (i) governorate/district authorities and mayors; and (ii) ISF and mayors/heads of municipal police (per district or major municipalities¹³⁸). Those platforms will enable institutions to discuss and tackle specific security challenges.

- Increase Networking within Communities: At local level, the project will increase opportunities for networking, particularly among members of the Lebanese communities as well as between those and Syrian communities.¹³⁹ Recent surveys demonstrated social capital is critical to access justice

¹³³ This could create conditions for people to use more violent or isolating means to take matters into their own hands particularly when considering the number of respondents who feel powerless to affect change in their communities, and who see themselves as competing with the refugee population – *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 75

¹³⁴ For example, the municipality where respondents are most content is Ghazieh, where the municipal government has established a forum to meet with residents on a regular basis – *Converging Interests of Conciliation: the social stability context in the Marjaayoun and Hasbay Qazas* (UNDP), 2016; *The Social Stability Context in the Nabatieh & Bint Jbeil Qazas* (UNDP), 2016

¹³⁵ For example, host communities surveyed said they would favour hosting refugees in camps in order to have direct control of refugees; while the positive impact on sectarian balance and infrastructure was barely mentioned – *Citizens’ perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 9. The survey highlighted that refugee camps was the favoured solution of respondents (64%) to manage the refugee crisis in Lebanon

¹³⁶ *The Social Stability Context in the Nabatieh & Bint Jbeil Qazas* (UNDP), 2016

¹³⁷ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 76

¹³⁸ Following the example of Tyr Municipality

¹³⁹ *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, International Alert (2016)

and security services, since those services are provided through a complex web of formal and informal structures. Yet, most vulnerable groups, either within host communities or Syrian refugees, have a very limited social capital. Networks of social relationships are critical to increase the social capital and get eventually access to justice and security.¹⁴⁰ This will be achieved through the initiatives of the community security committees that the project will support by the project; but also through the presence of the legal helpdesks.

SERVICES SENSITIVES TO THE NEEDS OF THE MOST VULNERABLE – WOMEN, YOUTH AND THE DETAINEES

The project will address the specific security and justice needs of women through a set of activities. The project will support specific awareness activities for women and the deployment of women paralegals in the legal helpdesks, as recommended by the National Strategy for Women in Lebanon¹⁴¹. Such focus is particularly important as studies on Syrian refugees report a strong demand from women for legal awareness sessions and orientation/advice.¹⁴² The project will also support women associations since women networks become increasingly gates to conflict resolution.¹⁴³ The project will also support efforts to curb SGBV and address gender-related security and justice issues. Such efforts are critical as analysis of the Millenium Development Goals, notably the indicators for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women (MDG 3), indicates that improving the physical security of women would help the realization of a wide range of sustainable development goals.¹⁴⁴

Addressing gender-related issues will be done by (i) gathering data on specific security and justice needs of women¹⁴⁵; (ii) supporting women promotion measures by municipalities in order to improve the number of municipal police women officers; (iii) developing trainings modules for the municipal police on gender-related issues; (iv) supporting the ISF pilot stations to improve gender-sensitive services; (v) ensuring specific legal assistance for women in the legal help-desks¹⁴⁶; and (vi) improving the detention conditions of women. The project will work with a wide range of civil society partners since existing studies demonstrate that Syrian refugees resort to medical personnel, family, NGOs and religious leaders when facing sexual harassment.¹⁴⁷

As regards the youth, the project will foresee specific funding for local community security plans activities targeting the youth. Such focus is important as perpetrators of attacks against Syrian refugees are often young men.¹⁴⁸ Detainees will also be a specific focus since pre-trial detention affects primarily poor households¹⁴⁹, namely those that are in competition with Syrian refugees over jobs. The focus will be on improving their detention conditions and providing pretrial detainees with legal aid. The project will also support initiatives towards social rehabilitation during and after detention. Such measures were recommended to Lebanon at the 2016 UPR session and were recommended by the Government of Lebanon.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Recommendation of the National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2011-2021, p. 27

¹⁴² Strong presence of women in those sessions. Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published).

¹⁴³ Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

¹⁴⁴ *Insecurity and violence in the post-2015 development agenda*, UNDP (2014)

¹⁴⁵ This will be done through the perception surveys conducted in at least seven pilots that include questions on specific security needs for women; and the access to security, justice and human rights survey.

¹⁴⁶ The project will notably work closely with medical institutions in order to orient women victims of violence towards the available services through paralegals, in line with UPR recommendations (the recommendations on measures to combat violence against women were accepted by Lebanon at the 2015 UPR).

session (cf. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, A/HRC/31/5/Add.1, p. 5 (2016)

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

¹⁴⁸ *The Social Stability Context in the Nabatieh & Bint Jbeil Qazas* (UNDP), 2016

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *The socio-economic Impact of Pre-trial Detention*, UNDP/OSJI (2010). Meetings with a judge responsible for the execution of sentences confirmed that most of pre-trial detention cases relate to minor cases, including those for which the detainee cannot afford legal counsel; or pay fines for infractions.

¹⁵⁰ Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, A/HRC/31/5/Add.1, United Nations (2016) – Recommendations 132.111; 132.112-132.122

2. DEVELOPING SYSTEMS & A CULTURE OF SERVICE DELIVERY WITHIN RULE OF LAW INSTITUTIONS

2.1 MINIMAL CAPACITIES FOR GOVERNORATES/DISTRICTS & MoIM/MOJ TO UNDERSTAND AND RESPOND TO SECURITY AND JUSTICES NEEDS OF MUNICIPALITIES

Strengthening data collection and analysis on security issues:

The project will support the establishment and production of data by the central and district security cells; and develop capacities of the District/Governorate and Ministry of Interior to analyse and communicate on data. Perceptions surveys conducted demonstrate the need to collect data at local level as perceptions of safety and security differ markedly according to location, local circumstances and whether the respondent is Lebanese or Syrian.¹⁵¹ There is a need to support national capacities to collect, analyse and disseminate data related to security issues as current surveys are conducted on an *ad hoc* basis by international partners; and ISF data suffer from double-reporting. Besides, there is a need to develop a set of data that enable cross-checking, notably crossing perception surveys with “hard data”. This is all the more needed since perceptions surveys alone may be sometimes misleading. For example, community leaders and local security officials allegedly downplay existing problems in their communities as they do not want their communities be perceived as troubled.¹⁵² On the other hand, humanitarian and development actors face the reverse situation where local authorities overplay local tensions in order to capture additional resources. Crossing data would also prevent certain bias. For example, community leaders and security officials reportedly tend to describe differences in perceptions along sectarian lines as they rank higher in their positions.¹⁵³

Supporting Governorate and District Authorities to lead on prevention, guidance and oversight of security measures taken by municipalities:

The project will support governorate and district authorities to play a lead role in the security cells and to be involved in the community security platforms; to articulate early responses to early warnings waning from the security cells; and to improve the oversight of the municipal police. The involvement of governorate and district authorities is important as they play a positive role in maintaining stability, for example by prohibiting municipalities to levy payments from refugees.¹⁵⁴

2.2 DEVELOP A PEOPLE-CENTERED CULTURE TO SECURITY AND JUSTICE

Develop ISF Academy human rights trainings for ISF units most at risks of human rights violations: The project will support the ISF Academy to develop human-rights-based curricula and coaching of ISF units that are most at risk of committing human rights violations (for example, corrections officers, anti-riot police, etc).

Improving Oversight Mechanisms of ISF: The project will improve the capacities of internal oversight bodies of the ISF, such as the anti-torture committee and the Human Rights Department. The project will also support the establishment of the anti-torture committee of the National Human Rights Commission. Those measures will enable to reduce the pre-trial detention rate; respond to violent radicalisation in prisons; and alleviate the socio-economic impact of detention for the detainees that is heavily felt among the most disadvantaged.

Production of an access to security and justice study & Goal 16 Framework: The project will support the production of an access to security and justice study at national level in order to identify concrete security issues and injustices faced by the population and vulnerable groups in particular; and table those issues at national level. Such research and national dialogue will encourage security and justice institutions to be less state-centric and progressively develop a service-delivery approach. The research will feed into a national

¹⁵¹ *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, International Alert (2016)

¹⁵² *Citizens’ perceptions of security threats stemming from the Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon*, International Alert (2015), p. 3

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *The Social Stability Context in the Nabatieh & Bint Jbeil Qazas* (UNDP), 2016

dialogue on Goal 16 in order to accompany the development of a service delivery approach with a people-centered M&E framework.

3. WORK AS MUCH ON PERCEPTION AS ON CONCRETE SECURITY ISSUES:

The gap between perception of insecurity and concrete security issues demonstrates the need to address perception issues as they are a source of potential tensions; can trigger inappropriate responses by municipalities; and mask the concrete security and justice needs in host communities. Addressing perception *per se* is also important as improving justice and security service delivery is not a silver bullet to manage tensions at local level.

Specific efforts will be made on awareness raising and communication. The reason is that a number of tensions within communities and among institutions in charge of justice and security relate to misperceptions on security challenges faced by local communities; and lack of awareness and knowledge of the respective mandates of institutions in charge of public order. For example, most of the tensions between municipal police and ISF relate to misunderstandings and lack of clarity over their respective missions, notably their mandate in relation to judiciary police despite a legal basis. The project will develop tools and measures to communicate on key information. Recent work with municipalities by UNDP demonstrated that improving awareness and communication around service delivery is instrumental in changing people's perceptions about the legitimacy of the municipality and social stability.¹⁵⁵ The project will notably work with local media.

4. LEVEL OF INTERVENTION – MUNICIPALITIES, UNIONS OF MUNICIPALITIES AND DISTRICTS:

The project will work with 6 pilot municipalities, as well as one Union of Municipalities. The project will support a local based approach for justice and security interventions, with a focus on municipalities that are most at risk of conflicts between host communities and Syrian refugees. The reason is that municipalities are tasked by the government to be the first line of response in the crisis and are the most trusted service providers by the population, although the quantity and quality of services is questionable.¹⁵⁶ They also have the legal basis to be that first line of response. Besides, a number of mayors would like to develop their municipal police, notably to resolve local conflicts.¹⁵⁷ Last but not least, a recent survey in municipalities where support to improve public service delivery was provided demonstrate that respondents are increasingly trusting the local authorities to take care of issues, having recognised the recent improvements to service delivery .¹⁵⁸ As a result, there is an opportunity for local authorities, such as the municipal government, to step in and address the problems of host communities before those choose to act on their own.

The project will work especially work with Unions of municipalities and Districts:

- Municipalities are gathered in unions since the vast majority of them do not have the necessary administrative and fiscal resources to deliver services. There are 51 municipal unions in Lebanon regrouping more than 700 municipalities (2/3 of all municipalities) and being home of two thirds of the resident population of the country.¹⁵⁹ Unions of Municipalities are an ideal platform to scale up support aimed at municipalities and their populations. The establishment of legal helpdesk will be done in close partnership with Unions of Municipalities.
- Governorate and districts authorities are already tasked by the MoIM to establish security cells. The project will use those platforms to introduce the “community security committees” approach.

¹⁵⁵ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 10

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27

¹⁵⁷ *UNDP Lebanon Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment*, p. 24 (2016)

¹⁵⁸ *Impact Evaluation Report, Lebanon Host Communities Project*, AKTIS/UNDP (2016), p. 75

¹⁵⁹ Most of them were created in the last 10 years – <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publications/1447330715-lcps-decentralization-booklet-english-2015-11-12.pdf>. Unions have between 3 and 53 member municipalities (average is 14 municipalities). These unions have pooled their resources in order to fund regional development projects and are recipients of donors' money – *Decentralization in Lebanon*, Sami Atallah, LCPS (2015) <http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=6>

III. RESULTS AND PARTNERSHIPS

Expected Results

The expected results of the project are:

1. Host communities and Syrian refugees have access to basic security services that respond to their needs in 8 pilots

- 1.1 Support institutional strengthening of the municipal police
- 1.2 Develop community security & state security actors platforms
- 1.3 Support ISF pilot stations to support MP in delivering basic security services

The project will support eight pilot municipalities to professionalise their municipal police, develop community approach to security, and improve the services of the local ISF gendarmerie station. This will be done by (i) implementing the new municipal police SOP and Code of Conduct, training and coaching of municipal police forces through the ISF¹⁶⁰, and renovating municipal police stations; (ii) establishing community security committees and platforms bringing together local authorities, civil society, and security forces at district/governorate level; and (iii) upgrade ISF gendarmerie stations with new community security trainings and management tools, basic renovation of stations, and improving management of cases for women victims of violence and other vulnerable groups. The project will also improve oversight of ISF station at local level by supporting the Information Branch to introduce a complaint mechanism in the pilot stations.

The planned activities will improve the services provided by the municipal police to host communities and Syrian refugees. The police will work increasingly according to professional standards, and be more accountable to local and governorate authorities. The municipal will also be in position to reinvest its core administrative and “social” police mandate; and better respond to small disputes. The participation of the wider population to map security challenges and response to them will enable municipalities to focus on violence prevention rather than implementing reactive measures; it will also give a sense of control to communities and appease local tensions based on misperceptions among communities. The support to the ISF gendarmerie local stations will improve the response of the ISF station when it is called upon by individuals; and improve coordination with municipal police. The existence of an improved service for women victims of violence and vulnerable groups will respond to the differentiated needs of men and women, as well as specific vulnerable groups, and bring ISF closer to local populations.

Specific security needs of women will be addressed by (i) community security committees’ actions targeting gender-related issues¹; and (ii) improved service for women victims of violence by ISF.

2. MoIM Governorate/District authorities and ISF provide support to municipalities to respond to basic security needs

- 2.1 Support MoIM to establish an early warning and early response mechanism to respond to community tensions
- 2.2 Support Governorate and District authorities to provide guidance and oversight to municipal police
- 2.3 Support MoIM and ISF Academy to provide human resources management tools, training and coaching for municipal police

The project will strengthen internal capacities of MoIM and ISF to better understanding, guiding and coaching municipalities on security issues. The project will support the MoIM and the ISF Academy to become a “resources center” for municipal polices. It will support the MoIM and ISF to develop (i) human resources management; (ii) planning; as well as (iii) training and coaching tools for the use of municipal police forces. The provision and implementation of those tools will improve the efficiency of municipal police. The planning will include women promotion plan in order to increase the number of women within the municipal police. Likewise, a training module on differentiated needs for women and men; and gender-based violence will be produced. Such support will improve the dialogue between ISF and municipal police, and enable the

¹⁶⁰ Training and coaching will include modules on gender-related issues

MoIM and ISF to exert some form of oversight over municipal police forces. The project will also support governorate and district authorities to perform their oversight role of municipal police by reforming the current internal complaints mechanism.

The project will also support the MoIM to develop an early warning and early response mechanism to address community tensions. Early warnings will be generated by the district security cells. Those were officially established by the Ministry of Interior in 2013 and produced a first set of data on community tensions in 2016, with UNDP support.¹⁶¹ The early warning system will enable to assess regularly (quarterly basis) the security impact of the Syrian crisis in host communities.

Besides, the project will support administrative authorities (District and Governorate), to be part of the security response. The project will build the capacities of Governorate and District authorities to shape an early-response to the warnings communicated by the security cells. The early-response will be developed through (i) the deployment of four personnel in four pilot governorates to improve the coordination of assistance to host communities by the governorate administration; (ii) and the production of applied research on specific security issues that are a source of concern at district/governorate and can guide the action of municipalities. The existence of an early-warning and early-response mechanism will enable to involve all relevant institutions to assess and tackle security issues faced by host communities; and favor a proactive rather than reactive actions by security institutions. The involvement of district and governorates administrations is required as the security impact of the Syrian crisis in host communities requires a broad-band understanding and response, beyond traditional security institutions.

Last but not least, the project will support the MoIM to complement security cells' data with hard data from rule of law institutions at national level. The project will develop a perception survey in at least 7 pilot location to track progress in improved security and justice services, notably for women. The project will also support the MoIM and the Ministry of Justice to harmonize criminal justice data in order authorities to have a more complete picture of security issues across the country; and develop national policies on security issues. These efforts will be completed by a study on access to security, justice and human rights in order to generate a national debate on security and justice services delivery and encourage rule of law institutions to shift from a state-focus to a population-focused model. The study will notably take into account the differentiated justice and security needs of women and men. Such research will feed a national debate on measuring Goal 16 in Lebanon and accompany rule of law institutions reforms from state-focus towards service-delivery approaches.

Beefing up both law-enforcement and administrative institutions, and articulating the various institutions in charge of security – municipalities, district, governorates and central ministries – will boost the efficiency of security services to the population. On the other hand, developing data and studies at national level will improve the understanding of security issues at local and national level, and enable the production and roll-out of proactive policies instead of reactive measures. It will also highlight the need to have a people-approach to rule of law and launch a discussion on the type of security and justice services/institutions Lebanese want for themselves.

Specific security needs of women will be identified through the perception survey in at least seven pilot municipalities; and the access to security, justice and human rights study. The survey and study will inform the gender-related activities of the project; and provide entry points for further policy and programming work on gender-related issues for both national and international partners. Those needs will be better responded to by increasing the number of women hired by the municipal police. The project will develop a women promotion plan with the pilot municipalities in the beginning of the project accordingly.

3. Women and vulnerable groups have access to basic justice services

- 3.1 Provide legal aid to host communities, including detainees
- 3.2 Support MoJ to develop elements for state-run legal helpdesk

¹⁶¹ Half of the 1,108 municipalities of Lebanon filled out the questionnaire in the second semester of 2016.

The project will establish legal helpdesks at local level that will sensitise and provide information and advice to the population, do alternative dispute resolution (for small cases), and refer individuals to the relevant administrative or non-state service, as well as to the Bar Association for legal representation in court. The results will be that the most disadvantaged will be given concrete answers, services and opportunities to respond to the injustices they are facing; and tensions within communities will be reduced.

Research demonstrates that the most vulnerable access to their rights when they feel they are entitled to them. This result is achieved during an interactive process whereby individuals feel listened too and can discuss concrete steps to respond to their injustices.¹⁶² Likewise, putting people in touch with administrative and social services, provided by state or non-state entities, empower them to solve their issues on their own.¹⁶³ Alternative dispute resolution produces usually good results since most of legal problems are solved by communication and negotiation between the parties;¹⁶⁴ save a lot of time (allowing resolution in weeks or months, compared to court, which can take years); and preserve relationships by helping people cooperate instead of creating one winner and one loser.

The project will support the MoJ, in partnership with the Bar Associations, to develop a “hybrid civil legal assistance system” whereby state institutions are involved in the design and quality assurance of legal assistance services to the most vulnerable that is provided by NGOs. The involvement of the MoJ is important since the Ministry is in charge of organising the justice system. Besides, the project will support the establishment of pilot legal helpdesk at local level, within unions of municipalities and municipalities. The reason for piloting legal helpdesks at municipal level are multiple. Aside from being the first line of response to the crisis, municipalities are the most trusted service providers by the population. Also, the legal needs of the most vulnerable are simple and should be resolved locally: in an environment in which they feel comfortable, in a language that they understand, and with the assistance of people with whom they can relate.

The piloting of legal helpdesk in four municipalities/Unions of municipalities will contribute to appease tensions within communities. It will also demonstrate the benefit of civil legal aid for social cohesion; and the limited cost implied by such a scheme.

The legal helpdesk will address gender-differentiated needs of the population through the following measures: (1) presence of one female legal assistant in every legal helpdesk; (2) sensitization on rights sessions targeting specifically women and girls; (3) information campaigns for state institutions that assist SGBV victims (healthcare centers, hospitals, etc) on existing legal assistance available in legal helpdesks; (4) gather data disaggregated by gender.

4. Access to justice, fundamental rights safeguards in the criminal justice system, and independent justice oversight mechanism are enhanced

- 4.1 Enhance access to justice of vulnerable groups with a focus on the criminal justice chain and mediation mechanism
- 4.2 Strengthen effectiveness and independence of justice oversight institutions and mechanisms

The project will leverage and consolidate the efforts of the multi-stakeholder “Access to Justice Working Group” coordinated by UNDP and composed of the Ministry of Justice, the Beirut and Tripoli Bar associations, in order to develop a legal aid helpdesk model for prisons, as well as an additional pilot helpdesk model to support the most vulnerable. Helpdesks will provide legal awareness sessions, legal information, assistance

¹⁶² See notably: *Des fabriques d'accès au(x) droit(s)*, Observatoire national de la pauvreté et de l'exclusion sociale (2011). Surveys on Refugees Syrian in Lebanon confirm that finding. They demonstrate that even support do not bring satisfying outcomes is valued by the most vulnerable as they feel empowered by such support. See notably *Informal Justice Mechanisms used by Syrian Refugees in Lebanon*, International Alert (2016).

¹⁶³ See notably : *Etude sur l'accès au droit et les besoins en matière d'information juridique en France*, AVIJED (2015)

¹⁶⁴ Settlement rates of up to 85 per cent for certain countries such as the UK. http://www.localcourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/adr/benefits_adr.aspx

and counselling, legal representation, and alternative dispute resolution and mediation services. These services will be provided for both civil and religious courts.

The efforts under this heading will be directly linked and informed by UNDP's ongoing efforts and lessons learned exercise, including the operations of the current three legal aid helpdesks (Baalbek, Saida and Tripoli), national consultations held on legal aid, a qualitative and quantitative legal aid needs assessment conducted, and will seek to build upon and complement previous EU funded efforts on legal aid. They will also inform longer-term UNDP activities aimed at delineating and promoting the establishment of a comprehensive State-sponsored, and partly "hybrid" (i.e. through NGOs), legal aid system to promote access to justice for all. In addition, focus will be put on mediation/ADR services, from a technical, awareness raising, and service delivery perspective, including by promoting the establishment of steering committee on mediation to promote implementation/operationalization of relevant legislation. The aim is to favor mediation/ADR mainstreaming to attempt to reduce the backlog in the justice system and tackle prison overcrowding. *Promote*

Efforts to ensure full implementation of the amended article 47 of the criminal code of procedure guarantees by justice stakeholders will be put forth, as well as their piloting in selected Internal Security Forces (ISF) stations. These efforts will be complemented by the delineation of a holistic strategic framework for the reform of the criminal justice and carceral system. Finally, to safeguard the rights of victims of the Beirut port explosions, a partnership with Beirut Bar Association will be put forth to support its prosecution office's efforts on this sensitive file.

An independent and effective judiciary is a sine qua non condition for increased accountability and the safeguard of rights. Under this output, a holistic, structured and multi-faceted approach to enhancing the independence, effectiveness and accountability of the judiciary, and to promoting/supporting justice sector reform is proposed. Strategically leveraging its leadership role and long-standing expertise, in synergy with its co-lead under the 3RF justice sector the EU, and informed by the TAEIX functional review, UNDP proposes to play a central role in the process surrounding the draft laws on the independence of the judiciary, both in terms of advocacy and implementation, in light of European and international standards. These efforts will be part of a larger outreach and sensitizations strategy aimed at promoting justice sector reform.

In parallel, sustained support to the High Judicial Council is envisaged, as it has the responsibility of ensuring "the proper functioning, dignity and independence of the judiciary, the proper functioning of the courts, and with taking the necessary decisions in this regard." In parallel, the action seeks to engage with the judicial inspection given the critical nature of its oversight and administration role, especially in assessing the performance of the judicial system and in seeking to highlight and address shortcomings. These multi-faceted efforts will also seek to promote increased coordination and cooperation between justice actors, including also the Conseil d'État, the Institute of Judicial Studies, and the Club of Judges. To avoid a quasi-paralysis of the sector, support will be provided in line with funding availability to ensure the functioning of the Beirut courthouse. Finally, given the critical nature of the human right promotion and protection mandate of the National Human Rights Commission, efforts will be put forth to ensure effective capacity building and implementation of its mandate, with the view of promoting its accreditation by GANHRI. These efforts will focus on ensuring the Commission meets Paris principles requirements in terms of efficiency and independence.

Links with higher results:

The expected results of the project are in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), UNDP Country Programme for Lebanon, and the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCPR).

United Nations Strategic Framework (UNSDCF) & UNDP Country Programme Document for Lebanon:

Outcome 1: Strengthened inclusive social contract grounded in human rights to enhance good governance, effective and accountable institutions, and women's participation.

Output 1.2. Lebanon has formulated relevant green, gender- and age-sensitive legislation, policies, strategies, plans, and regulations required to implement the national reform agenda

Outcome indicator 1.1. Population percentage that agrees with key policy decisions of the Government. Baseline: 0. Target: 60%

Outcome 2.: Strengthened security, stability, justice, and peace

Output 2.4. Civic space and access to justice expanded for women and men, racism and discrimination addressed, and rule of law, human rights and equity strengthened.

Outcome indicator 2.2. (Goals indicator 16.3.1) Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms (sex-disaggregated) Baseline: TBD. Target: 60%.

Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCPR)

Response area 1: provide material and legal assistance to the most vulnerable among the displaced from Syrian and the poor Lebanese

Response area 2: link vulnerable groups and localities to strengthened basic services and protection

Response area 3: support national institutions to preserve social stability

Resources Required to Achieve the Expected Results: Cf. Multi-year Workplan

Partnerships

The project will work primarily with municipalities and Unions of municipalities in the pilot locations. The reason is that Municipalities are the first line of response in the crisis and are the most trusted service providers by the population; they are in charge of the municipal police and will also host legal helpdesks. Engagement with Unions of Municipalities will be central to the scaling up phase of the project. Another reason for the engagement with Municipalities and Unions of Municipalities is that they can contract NGOs to deliver legal assistance services as planned by the project.

The project will also work with district and governorate authorities. The partnership with those authorities will take place through the presence of a UNV in two pilot governorates; partnerships with the UNDP DRM project in two additional pilot governorates (through two UNV of UNDP DRM project); field visits and workshops. The partnership will enable governorate and district authorities to activate district security cells; as well as to provide an early response to warning identified at local level, notably through the security cells.

At central level, the project will further build on the existing strong partnership with the MoIM and the ISF. Such support will enable the MoIM and ISF to become a resource center for municipal police forces; and to coach and improve municipal police work; and enable the MoIM to better understand and analyse security challenges at local level. The project will develop with the Ministry of Justice and the Bar Association the legal helpdesks. Such partnership will enable the Ministry of Justice to play a critical role in providing strategic leadership and oversight in the establishment of the legal helpdesks; but also to generate a consensus among justice sector stakeholders, including the Bar Associations, on the legal helpdesk model. The project will also work with the Ministry of Social Affairs, jointly with the MoJ and other justice sector stakeholders, to define social rehabilitation of detainees.

The project will equally work closely civil society, notably with women organisations, across all activities of the project. Such partnership will enable the project to execute specific deliverables such as the sensitization of the population in pilot municipalities on their rights; the establishment of legal helpdesks in pilot locations (through a bidding process); and social reintegration of detainees. The partnership with civil society will also play a critical role in engaging with host communities and Syrian refugees, as well as rule of law institutions on security and justice issues at large – for example, the development of social reintegration for detainees, and responding to SGBV and gender related challenges.

The project will work closely with academia in order to develop baseline studies and define a framework for the Goal 16. This will include partnerships with international academic institutions and NGOs in order to facilitate transfer of knowledge on specific areas (access to justice and security study; and Goal 16).

The project will be implemented jointly with UNCHR. It will work in close coordination with relevant UN entities, notably UNFPA, OHCHR and UNODC; as well as key international partners supporting rule of law in Lebanon, such as EU, INL, the Netherlands, Switzerland and USAID.

Risks and Assumptions: cf. risk matrix

Stakeholder Engagement

The ultimate beneficiaries of the Project are Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees, including specific vulnerable groups such as women and girls, the youth and detainees. The identification of communities will be based on the Lebanese Government and United Nations agreed upon Vulnerability Map (2014); and the identification with the MoIM of the eight pilot municipalities. These communities will be engaged through the community security committees; but also through the legal helpdesks. Those helpdesks will enable to reach out vulnerable groups, notably women and girls. Engaging with women's organisations on key issues such as legal awareness will also improve women and girls access to their rights. The project will engage with the youth through earmarked funding for youth-related initiatives designed by community security committees. The project will work detainees of two prisons (Roumieh and a women prison) through social reintegration measures.

Key stakeholders of the project include the MoIM, MoJ, MoSA, ISF, as well as municipal, district and governorate authorities; and the Bar Associations. Engagement with those institutions will be done at every stage of the project, with a focus on the planning of activities. Another group of key stakeholders are academia and NGOs that will be engaged through contracting for specific deliverable; and through platforms to discuss national-wide issues in relation to access to justice and security, as well as Goal 16.

South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSC/TrC)

The project will partner with countries that can bring valuable experience and/or knowledge to the stakeholders of the project. The project will notably develop exchanges with Tunisia on community policing; Latin American countries on data collection and national violence observatories; and European countries on oversight.

The project will also learn from countries affected by the Syrian Crisis, notably Jordan and Turkey, through UNDP country offices primarily. The project will also engage with Member States committed to measure the Goal 16 through the Global Tripartite Alliance for Goal 16.

Knowledge

The project will produce an access to justice and security study that will be used to initiate a national dialogue on the necessary move from state-focus to service delivery approaches for rule of law institutions. The project will also support the development of a framework for the Goal 16 that will table, encourage and capture access to justice and security and positive peace efforts in the country.

The work with security cells will also feed into national discussions on how to use rule of law data for policy making.

The project will produce a number of communication products in order to ensure that technical support is tailor-made to differentiated audiences; and can be used in the long-term by the project partners. The project will notably hire a communication specialist in order to develop such products.

Sustainability and Scaling Up

Sustainability:

While the project will support the rapid delivery of justice and security to host communities and Syrian refugees through municipalities; it will develop capacities of central institutions (MoIM, ISF, MoJ) as well as governorate and district authorities to support municipalities to deliver those services in the long-run.

In the area of security, this will be done by making the ISF a resources centre for municipalities on training/coaching, human resources management and planning; supporting district/governorate authorities

capacities to respond to early warning; and developing capacities of the MoIM and MoJ to gather and analyse data that will inform national policies on Rule of Law in the future. In the area of justice, sustainability of support to legal assistance will be achieved through a hybrid-system whereby the MoJ is involved in the design and quality assurance of legal assistance services to the most vulnerable that is provided by NGOs, including through the development of a status and harmonized trainings for legal assistants.

Scaling Up:

The project will be scaled up starting from year three through Unions of Municipalities and/or Governorate and District authorities. Tools, mechanisms and overall knowledge developed for municipalities will be transferred to unions of municipalities and district that are best placed, from an administrative standpoint, to disseminate them to municipalities. One of the pilot will be a Union of Municipalities from year one, in order to understand and develop specific service lines for such partners and be ready for the scaling up on year three.

IV. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness

The strategy is grounded in an evidence base outlined in the Assessment and related UNDP and other studies on security and justice in Lebanon. Close collaboration with partners and beneficiaries, and building on existing areas of work undertaken by UNDP work will allow for cost efficiencies. The Project will also promote cost efficiencies through:

- Building on the current work and partnerships of other UNDP projects including Peacebuilding Project and LHSP;
- Utilizing the efforts in engaging with refugee and host communities that have been developed by key partners such as UNHCR;
- Benefiting from current and past relations between UNDP and the Lebanese Government, including MoIM and MoJ, and utilizing the existing Lebanese institutional structure and services to minimize cost and ensure national ownership, which will in return enhance the effectiveness of the anticipated results.
- Relying on one international staff member for technical and management purposes while the remainder of the Project team staff will be Lebanese nationals. This will balance international and local expertise while keeping to a necessary minimum the relatively expensive unit costs of international staff and consultants.

Project Management

The Project will be managed by a team based in Beirut in premises located nearby the UNDP Country Office. The project will make use of UNDP existing engagement with hundreds of municipalities and communities throughout Lebanon.

The Leadership on the management and the overall direction of the action will be provided by the UNDP Resident Representative .. The Project will be assisted by the Country Office for its operations (procurement, finances and HR). The Head of the Governance and Reform Pillar be in charge of the quality assurance of the project. He/she will ensure the project develop synergies with existing portfolios, and ensure the Project is delivering within the Country Office Programme Document (CPD 2022-2025).

V. RESULTS FRAMEWORK**Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework:**

Strengthened security, stability, justice, and peace

Strengthened inclusive social contract grounded in human rights to enhance good governance, effective and accountable institutions, and women's participation.

Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets:

Outcome 1: Strengthened inclusive social contract grounded in human rights to enhance good governance, effective and accountable institutions, and women's participation.

Output 1.2. Lebanon has formulated relevant green, gender- and age-sensitive legislation, policies, strategies, plans, and regulations required to implement the national reform agenda

Outcome indicator 1.1. Population percentage that agrees with key policy decisions of the Government. Baseline: 0. Target: 60%

Outcome 2.: Strengthened security, stability, justice, and peace

Output 2.4. Civic space and access to justice expanded for women and men, racism and discrimination addressed, and rule of law, human rights and equity strengthened.

Outcome indicator 2.2. (Goals indicator 16.3.1) Proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms (sex-disaggregated) Baseline: TBD. Target: 60%.

Applicable Output(s) from the UNDP Strategic Plan:

Civic space and access to justice expanded, racism and discrimination addressed, and rule of law, human rights and equity strengthened

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE		TARGETS (by frequency of data collection)	DATA COLLECTION METHODS & RISKS
			Value	Year	Year	
					2023	
Output 1: Host communities and Syrian refugees have access to basic security services that respond to their needs- GEN 2	1.1. # of UoM/districts to which the Municipal police reform program has been upscaled to	Project progress report	2	2022	4	Project team
	1.2. # municipalities adhering to at least one component of the reform	Security cell District & Municipal authorities	225	2022	235	Security cells report. Reporting from districts
	1.3. # of districts to which oversight & management tools develop through the committee for the reform of the municipal police are rolled-out	Project progress reports	0	2022	16	Project teams in coordination with committee for the reform of the MP

Output 2: MoIM Governorate/District authorities and ISF provide support to municipalities to respond to basic security needs – GEN1	2.1 # ISF gendarmerie Station rehabilitated in line with community policing standards	Project progress report	1	2022	2	Project team
	2.2 # of municipalities benefiting from the new ISF Academy training (disaggregated by number of officers per municipality)	MoIM (official requests submitted by Municipalities; and Certificates delivered to Municipal Police by ISF academy)	2	2022	15	Project teams in coordination with ISF academy
Output 3: Vulnerable groups, including women, have access to basic justice services- GEN 3	3.1 # of beneficiaries that use one or several services of the legal helpdesk centres (disaggregated by gender) (cumulative)	Legal Helpdesks Reports	6000	2022	10000	Project team in coordination with A2JWG.
	3.2 # of individuals targeted by legal awareness campaigns (disaggregated by gender) (cumulative)	Legal Helpdesks Reports	3600	2022	7000	Project team in coordination with A2JWG.
	3.3 # of Municipalities that have an operational legal helpdesk	Legal Helpdesks Reports	3	2022	4	Project team in coordination with A2JWG

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE		TARGETS	DATA COLLECTION
			Value	Year	Value	
Output 4 Access to justice, fundamental rights safeguards in the criminal justice system, and independent justice oversight mechanism are enhanced- Gen 3	4.1 # persons benefitting from services from new legal aid helpdesk (disaggregated by gender, type of services)	Helpdesk reports	0 Desk not yet established	2022	4000	Project staff in coordination with A2JWG
	4.2 # Detention centers having a functional legal aid helpdesk	Project	0	2022	2	Project staff in coordination with A2JWG
	4.3 % of detainees from supported detention centers benefitting from services of the legal aid helpdesk	Helpdesk reports	0 no desk established	2022	15%	Project staff in coordination with A2JWG
	4.4 # individuals benefitting from legal assistance during investigation phases supported through Bar associations referral mechanisms	Reports from Bar Associations	Tripoli Bar: 60 Beirut Bar: TBD	2022	300	Project staff in coordination with respective Bar associations teams
	4.5 # justice/security actors sensitized and/or trained on art 47 guarantees (disaggregated by category of actors and gender)	Activity reports			100	Project staff

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE		TARGETS	DATA COLLECTION
			Value	Year	Value	
	4.6 # awareness sessions on mediation/ADR conducted	Activity reports	n/a		15	Project staff
	4.7 # pilot police stations fully implementing art. 47 guarantees	ISF	0	2021	TBD	Project staff
	4.8 # critical justice infrastructures equipped with alternative energy sources	<i>MoJ</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>Project staff</i>
	4.9 Progress on developing and implementing methodology for monitoring and inspecting the functioning of the courts	<i>Judicial inspection Commission</i>	<i>In situ inspections stopped</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>Methodology finalized and at least 5 courts inspected based on the criteria set forth by it</i>	<i>Project staff</i>
	4.10 Progress on developing monitoring & oversight tools, and functional/organisational frameworks of justice oversight bodies	<i>Activity reports</i>	<i>1: judges evaluation criteria developed but, not implemented</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>At least 2 new tools being used/implemented</i>	<i>Project staff</i>
	4.11 Progress in strengthening capacities of National Human Rights Commission in light of Paris principles	<i>Activity report NHRC</i>	<i>NHRC is hardly operational</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>NHRC in a position to submit accreditation application to GANHRI</i>	<i>Project staff</i>

VI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

In accordance with UNDP's programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plans:

Monitoring Plan

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by project management.
Monitor and Manage Risk	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring measures and plans that may have been required as per UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP's audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Risks are identified by project management and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the project team and used to inform management decisions.
Annual Project Quality Assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP's quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision making to improve the project.	Annually	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance.
Review and Make Course Corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring actions to inform decision making.	At least annually	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by the project board and used to make course corrections.
Project Report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level, the annual project quality rating summary, an updated risk log with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	Annually, and at the end of the project (final report)	
Project Review (Project Board)	The project's governance mechanism (i.e., project board) will hold regular project reviews to assess the performance of the project and review the Multi-Year Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of the project. In the project's final year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to socialize project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences.	annually	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.

Evaluation Plan¹⁶⁵

Evaluation Title	Key Evaluation Stakeholders
Mid-Term Evaluation	MOIM, MOJ, ISF, UNHCR, OHCHR, Pilot Municipalities, District Authorities, Governors, CSO's, Donors
Final Project Evaluation	MOIM, MOJ, ISF, UNHCR, OHCHR, Pilot Municipalities, District Authorities, Governors, CSO's, Donors

¹⁶⁵ Optional, if needed

VII. MULTI-YEAR WORK PLAN

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Planned Budget Amount (USD)			
		2023	2024	2025	Total)
Output 1: Host communities and Syrian refugees have access to basic security services that respond to their needs	1.1 Support strengthening of the municipal police (including women promotion) at local level	475,000	400,000	400,000	1,275,000
Output 2: MoIM Governorate/District authorities and ISF provide support to municipalities to respond to basic security needs	2.1 Support institutional strengthening of ISF, ISF academy and municipal police (national level)	475,000	450,000	450,000	1,375,000
Output 3: Vulnerable groups, including women, have access to basic justice services	3.1 Provide legal aid to host communities and detainees (including legal awareness for women)	400,000	400,000	400,000	1,200,000
Output 4: <i>Access to justice, fundamental rights safeguards in the criminal justice system, and independent justice oversight mechanism are enhanced</i>	4.1 Enhance access to justice of vulnerable groups with a focus on the criminal justice chain and mediation mechanism	580,000	300,000	145,000	1,025,000
	4.2 Strengthen effectiveness and independence of justice oversight institutions and mechanisms	710,000	200,000	110,000	910,000
General Management Support (8%)		211,200	140,000	120,000	471,200
Project Management Team		560,000	560,000	500,000	1,620,000
Sub total		3,411,200	2,450,000	2,015,000	7,876,200
TOTAL					

VIII. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

UNDP is designated as the Direct Implementing Agency who will thus be accountable for all resources allocated, whether their source is UNDP, other UN entities, donors or from government cost sharing. In addition to regular technical backstopping and monitoring activities regularly provided, the UNDP Country Office shall provide the support services for the execution of the programme. This will ensure that technical and substantive expertise is available to the Programme for coordination, recruitment, and procurement and contracting.

Services shall be provided in accordance with UNDP procedures, rules and regulations. An international Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) project Manager will be responsible for the effective management of the project team, implementation of the project and advising the Country Office on Rule of Law related issues. The team will be composed of nine project staff as per the below Organizational structure. In addition, short term consultants will be recruited as needed. At the same time, the Project team will benefit from the long-term partnerships and relationships in which the UNDP had established with key Ministries and institutions, notably MoJ, MoIM, and the High Judicial Council among others.


The project's team will be coordinating with and reporting to the Project Board, with close interaction with the UNDP Governance and Reform pillar. The project's team will work in close coordination with UNHCR for activities that are developed jointly, notably on access to justice. Likewise, the project's team will work in close coordination with OHCHR for activities related to the protection and promotion of human rights.

The Project Board is formally established to provide technical support, share relevant information, and review progress. The Project Board is comprised by: (i) Executive: a representative of UNDP providing in particular technical guidance to the project; (ii) Development partners (Supplier): Representatives of the donors and relevant UN partner agencies; (iii) Senior Beneficiaries: Representatives of MoJ, MoIM, ISF, HJC...). Additional partners/stakeholders can be invited as Observers to share relevant information as and when required.

The role of the Project Board is to:

- Provide overall guidance and direction to the project, ensuring it remains within any specified constraints, and promote gender equality and social inclusion (LNOB) in the project implementation;
- Review project performance based on monitoring, evaluation and reporting, including standard quality assurance checks, progress reports, risk logs, spot checks/audit reports and the combined delivery report;
- Address any high-level project issues as raised by the project manager and project assurance;
- Provide guidance on emerging and/or pressing project risks and agree on possible mitigation and management actions to address specific risks (including ensuring compliance with UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards, Fraud/corruption, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment);
- Agree or decide on project manager's tolerances as required, within the parameters set by UNDP (Manage Change in the PPM) and the donor, and provide direction and decisions for exceptional situations when the project manager's tolerances are exceeded;
- Advise on major and minor amendments to the project within the parameters set by UNDP and the donor;
- Agree or decide on a project suspension or cancellation, if required; (note that for GEF and GCF projects it is UNDP that decides to suspend or cancel and project and the [Project Board or Project Steering Committee] is informed/consulted only).
- Provide high-level direction and recommendations to the project management unit to ensure that the agreed deliverables are produced satisfactorily according to plans.
- Receive and address project level grievance, including overseeing whatever specific compliance and stakeholder response (or grievance) mechanisms have been put in place so that individuals and communities potentially affected by the project have access to effective mechanisms and procedures for raising concerns about the social and environmental performance of the project .
- Engage in the low value grant selection process where there is no Grant Selection Committee, as guided by the Low Value Grants – UNDP Operational Guide

PROJECT ORGANISATION STRUCTURE



IX. LEGAL CONTEXT AND RISK MANAGEMENT

LEGAL CONTEXT STANDARD CLAUSES

Option a. Where the country has signed the [Standard Basic Assistance Agreement \(SBAA\)](#)

This project document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement between the Government of (country) and UNDP, signed on (date). All references in the SBAA to “Executing Agency” shall be deemed to refer to “Implementing Partner.”

Option b. Where the country has NOT signed the [Standard Basic Assistance Agreement \(SBAA\)](#)

The project document shall be the instrument envisaged and defined in the [Supplemental Provisions](#) to the Project Document, attached hereto and forming an integral part hereof, as “the Project Document”.

RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARD CLAUSES

UNDP (DIM)

1. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS.)
2. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project funds]¹⁶⁶ [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document]¹⁶⁷ are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.
3. Social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (<http://www.undp.org/ses>) and related Accountability Mechanism (<http://www.undp.org/secu-srm>).
4. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will: (a) conduct project and programme-related activities in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project or programme to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.
5. All signatories to the Project Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any programme or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.
6. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will ensure that the following obligations are binding on each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient:
 - a. Consistent with the Article III of the SBAA [*or the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document*], the responsibility for the safety and security of each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient and its personnel and property, and of UNDP’s property in such responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-recipient’s custody, rests with such responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient. To this end, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall:
 - i. put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
 - ii. assume all risks and liabilities related to such responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-recipient’s security, and the full implementation of the security plan.
 - b. UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-recipient’s obligations under this Project Document.

¹⁶⁶ To be used where UNDP is the Implementing Partner

¹⁶⁷ To be used where the UN, a UN fund/programme or a specialized agency is the Implementing Partner

- c. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will take appropriate steps to prevent misuse of funds, fraud or corruption, by its officials, consultants, subcontractors and sub-recipients in implementing the project or programme or using the UNDP funds. It will ensure that its financial management, anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies are in place and enforced for all funding received from or through UNDP.
- d. The requirements of the following documents, then in force at the time of signature of the Project Document, apply to each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient: (a) UNDP Policy on Fraud and other Corrupt Practices and (b) UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations Investigation Guidelines. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient agrees to the requirements of the above documents, which are an integral part of this Project Document and are available online at www.undp.org.
- e. In the event that an investigation is required, UNDP will conduct investigations relating to any aspect of UNDP programmes and projects. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will provide its full cooperation, including making available personnel, relevant documentation, and granting access to its (and its consultants', subcontractors' and sub-recipients') premises, for such purposes at reasonable times and on reasonable conditions as may be required for the purpose of an investigation. Should there be a limitation in meeting this obligation, UNDP shall consult with it to find a solution.
- f. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will promptly inform UNDP as the Implementing Partner in case of any incidence of inappropriate use of funds, or credible allegation of fraud or corruption with due confidentiality.

Where it becomes aware that a UNDP project or activity, in whole or in part, is the focus of investigation for alleged fraud/corruption, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will inform the UNDP Resident Representative/Head of Office, who will promptly inform UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI). It will provide regular updates to the head of UNDP in the country and OAI of the status of, and actions relating to, such investigation.

- g. UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient of any funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement.

Note: The term "Project Document" as used in this clause shall be deemed to include any relevant subsidiary agreement further to the Project Document, including those with responsible parties, subcontractors and sub-recipients.

- h. Each contract issued by the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient in connection with this Project Document shall include a provision representing that no fees, gratuities, rebates, gifts, commissions or other payments, other than those shown in the proposal, have been given, received, or promised in connection with the selection process or in contract execution, and that the recipient of funds from it shall cooperate with any and all investigations and post-payment audits.
- i. Should UNDP refer to the relevant national authorities for appropriate legal action any alleged wrongdoing relating to the project or programme, the Government will ensure that the relevant national authorities shall actively investigate the same and take appropriate legal action against all individuals found to have participated in the wrongdoing, recover and return any recovered funds to UNDP.
- j. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall ensure that all of its obligations set forth under this section entitled "Risk Management" are passed on to its subcontractors and sub-recipients and that all the clauses under this section entitled "Risk Management Standard Clauses" are adequately reflected, *mutatis mutandis*, in all its sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into further to this Project Document.

X. ANNEXES

Annex1: Risk Matrix

#	Description	Date Identified	Type	Impact & probability	Countermeasures/ Mngt response	Owner
	Political instability and/or stalemate at national level hampers legislative work and reform implementation	2022	Political Strategic	Parliamentary elections results translate in a lengthy government formation and/or presidential vacancy, the installation of a non-reform-oriented government. Leads to to difficulties passing legislation and undertaking reform, and potentially a worsening of the socio-economic situation P = Moderate I = High	Focus on implementation of existing legislation, while laying the grounds for reform Utilise existing agreements with ministries & established partnerships Strengthen advocacy and coordination with stakeholders, including the international community Linkages to 3RF advocacy and other priority frameworks	Govt
	Further deterioration of the socio-economic situation and institutional shortage in basic services such as electricity and fuel etc. in addition to weak institutional capacities	2022	Operational Strategic	Capacities of relevant institutions impacted, funds decreasing further, implementation of reforms are more difficult and long-term development perspectives are de-prioritized. Possibility of quasi-paralysis of the justice sector. Morale of partners affected and impacting implementation P = Moderate I = High	Project working on two tracks: ensuring basic operations + reform. Provisions will be made to maintain institutional operationality related to the expected results, such as with installation of alternative power sources. Project is ensuring in its design a marge of flexibility to ensure appropriate responses to achieve the expected result despite the challenges of the critical situation. Strengthen coordination mechanisms with international stakeholders to deliver effective and complementary aid, and joint strategic advocacy Support capacity building of institutions, including to support security and justice service deliverers Apply a conflict sensitive and 'Do no harm'-perspective on project implementation	Govt

	Lack of political will to undertake reforms	2022	Political	<p>Would prevent reform from moving forward and negatively impact efforts</p> <p>Parts of the project might have a higher risk of being stalled due to the lack of political will because of politicised contexts</p> <p>P=2</p> <p>I=2</p>	<p>Focus on implementation of existing legislation, while laying the grounds for reform</p> <p>Utilise existing agreements with ministries & established partnerships</p> <p>Strengthen advocacy and coordination with stakeholders, including the international community</p> <p>Linkages to 3RF advocacy and other priority frameworks</p> <p>Advocacy and outreach efforts to sensitize judiciary stakeholders (judges, lawyers) and the general public</p>	Govt
	Increase in social tensions leading to a worsening of security situation	2022	Safety Operational	<p>Protracted and compounded crises is leading to increase in tensions and making the security environment more volatile. If it worsens, it can shift priorities and even impact project implementation due to safety reasons, or inaccessibility of certain areas</p> <p>P = Moderate</p> <p>I = High</p>	<p>Strong coordination with UNDP tension monitoring system, which can help inform responses at both project and all UNDP level.</p> <p>Conducting of activities via local NGOs</p> <p>Streamline 'Do no harm'-principles and conflict sensitive approaches in programming</p>	Govt/ UNDP
	Changes within stakeholder institutions (HJC, MoJ, Bar Associations...)	2022	Strategic/political	<p>Can delay or derail implementation especially if no continuity is ensured</p> <p>P =High</p> <p>I = Moderate</p>	<p>- Actively engage at all stages main stakeholders to promote sustained engagement</p> <p>- Build upon ongoing initiatives, partnerships, and work at both mid-technical and high-political level, to ensure institutional continuity when changes arise.</p> <p>- Where predictable (Bar association, MoJ...) actively prepare transition phase and proactively engage new leadership</p>	Govt/ UNDP

	Limited human resources within the administration at national and governorate/district levels	2022	Strategic Operational	<p>Insufficient and inadequate resourcing of relevant parts of security, judicial and administrative sector. The socio-economic situation continues to deteriorate leading to resignations and brain drain. This can lead to a loss of continuity and a need to limit the scope of activities. The project is already facing a situation of limited available human resources</p> <p>P = 3 I = 2</p>	<p>Political dialogue with national partners to have limited but qualified focal personnel for the project</p> <p>Empower and motivate existing capacities</p> <p>Support institutions to provide their employees with better work conditions</p>	Govt
	Lack of willingness from stakeholders to cooperate amongst themselves	2022	Strategic	<p>There is a risk of conflicting views and politicised discourse/situations. Anti-establishment sentiments prevalent within civil society. This can lead in non-inclusive processes and adoption of legislation rejected by actors in charge of implementing it</p> <p>P=Moderate I= Moderate</p>	<p>Put in place and implement an active outreach strategy</p> <p>Building on UNDP's strategic positioning/partnerships with main stakeholders to promote trust</p>	UNDP
	Lack of coordination amongst international stakeholders	2022	Strategic	<p>Weakening of momentum and diluting of advocacy efforts. Confusion in messaging. Risk of derailing process.</p> <p>P: Low I: Moderate</p>	<p>Strengthen coordination efforts and knowledge sharing</p> <p>Build on UNDP leadership role in 3RF justice sector</p> <p>Engage more actively in coordination structures</p>	UNDP
	Equipment provided is diverted to other purposes for which it was given or for private use	2022	Operational	<p>Due to widespread shortages, lack of available resources and growing needs, equipment is diverted.</p> <p>P: Low I: Low</p>	<p>Regular monitoring.</p> <p>Should it appear that the equipment provided has been diverted, UNDP will suspend all equipment delivery and engage with the national authorities until assurances are received that the situation has been addressed and measures put in place to avoid such occurrence in the future.</p>	Govt

	Limited national budgetary allocations to support relevant reforms and institutionalization,	2022	Operational Strategic	<p>With the severe depreciation of the currency and the acute financial crisis, Govt is no position to allocate sufficient resources for reform and institutionalization.</p> <p>P: High</p> <p>I: Moderate</p>	<p>Project is ensuring in its design a marge of flexibility to ensure appropriate responses to achieve the expected result despite the challenges of the critical situation</p> <p>Project provision will enable to ensure the establishment of appropriate conditions and rehabilitation program for children The project will cover essential material/equipment/staffing needs to ensure the sustainability of the action and will ensure a consultants, tailored training and close monitoring for staff</p>	Govt
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Annex 2– Terms of Reference

Annex 3: Social and Environmental Screening

Project Information

Project Information

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|--|---|
| 1. Project Title | Enhancing Community Security and Access to Justice in Lebanese Host Communities |
| 2. Location
(Global/Region/Country) | Lebanon |

Part A. Integrating Overarching Principles to Strengthen Social and Environmental Sustainability

QUESTION 1: How Does the Project Integrate the Overarching Principles in order to Strengthen Social and Environmental Sustainability?

Briefly describe in the space below how the Project mainstreams the human-rights based approach

The project is designed based on the recommendations of a comprehensive rule of law sector-wide assessment that has identified the rights- holders and their entitlements and corresponding duty bearers and their obligations. The assessment identified the availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of the identified services and formed the structure of the proposed project.

The project's strategy is adopting a local-based approach in which it prioritizes the response to security and justice needs at the local level. The strategy builds on HRBA's concept in which it determines the relationship between individuals and groups with valid claims (rights-holders) and State and non-state actors with correlative obligations (duty-bearers). The project is focused on (i) adopting participatory approaches and (ii) data collection systems in which local-based development experiences will inform the policies and reform at the national level; but also (iii) strengthening accountability mechanisms within security institutions.

For example, municipal police at municipalities' level will work in consultative sessions to develop their own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Code of Conduct (CoC) that they will convey to the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities (MoIM) for adoption. The consultative process will also benefit from participation of communities and their representatives in different localities. Likewise, the project will support the MoIM to develop its capacities to collect, manage and analyse data from municipalities across Lebanon in order to understand and respond to concerns and needs at local level. The project will also support the ISF to strengthen its internal oversight mechanisms, notably the anti-torture committee and the human rights department. Similar approach is adopted at the justice angle with the development of legal assistance in pilot municipalities, namely provision of a justice service to the population, and in particular, to the most vulnerable. These experiences will inform the policy decisions at the level of Ministry of Justice (MoJ). In other words, the focus of the project is addressing the justice and security needs for host communities and Syrian refugees through working with these communities as rights holders and strengthening the response of the authorities as duty bearers. This explains the focus on working with municipal police and developing legal assistance services at local/district level.

Briefly describe in the space below how the Project is likely to improve gender equality and women's empowerment

The project will address the specific security and justice needs of women through a set of activities. The project will support specific awareness activities for women and the deployment of women paralegals in the legal helpdesks, as recommended by the National Strategy for Women in Lebanon¹⁶⁸. Such focus is particularly important as studies on Syrian refugees report a strong demand from women for legal awareness sessions and orientation/advice.¹⁶⁹ The project will also support women associations since women networks become increasingly gates to conflict resolution.¹⁷⁰ The project will also support efforts to curb SGBV and address gender-related security and justice issues. Such efforts are critical as analysis of the Millenium Development Goals, notably the indicators for the promotion of gender equality

¹⁶⁸ Recommendation of the National Strategy for Women in Lebanon 2011-2021, p. 27

¹⁶⁹ Strong presence of women in those sessions. Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published).

¹⁷⁰ Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

and the empowerment of women (MDG 3), indicates that improving the physical security of women would help the realization of a wide range of sustainable development goals.¹⁷¹

Addressing gender-related issues will be done by (i) gathering data on specific security and justice needs of women¹⁷²; (ii) supporting women promotion measures by municipalities in order to improve the number of municipal police women officers; (iii) developing trainings modules for the municipal police on gender-related issues; (iv) supporting the ISF pilot stations to improve gender-sensitive services; (v) ensuring specific legal assistance for women in the legal help-desks¹⁷³; and (vi) improving the detention conditions of women. The project will work with a wide range of civil society partners since existing studies demonstrate that Syrian refugees resort to medical personnel, family, NGOs and religious leaders when facing sexual harassment.¹⁷⁴

Briefly describe in the space below how the Project mainstreams environmental sustainability

The project does not have dimensions that might affect the environment. The work with physical structure will be limited through working with the current premises without constructing new ones. The legal aid component might receive cases of disputes over land and property and will support with the needed justice channels to address grievances.

Part B. Identifying and Managing Social and Environmental Risks

QUESTION 2: What are the Potential Social and Environmental Risks?

Note: Describe briefly potential social and environmental risks identified in Attachment 1 – Risk Screening Checklist (based on any “Yes” responses). If no risks have been identified in Attachment 1 then note “No Risks Identified” and skip to Question 4 and Select “Low Risk”. Questions 5 and 6 not required for Low Risk Projects.

QUESTION 3: What is the level of significance of the potential social and environmental risks?

Note: Respond to Questions 4 and 5 below before proceeding to Question 6

QUESTION 6: What social and environmental assessment and management measures have been conducted and/or are required to address potential risks (for Risks with Moderate and High Significance)?

Risk Description	Impact and Probability (1-5)	Significance (Low, Moderate, High)	Comments	Description of assessment and management measures as reflected in the Project design. If ESIA or SESA is required note that the assessment should consider all potential impacts and risks.
Risk 1: Likelihood that the Project would exclude any potentially affected stakeholders, in particular	I = 3 P = 2	Low	Syrian Displaced are identified as a vulnerable	The project will work along a do-no-harm and conflict-sensitivity approach at local level, in order to

¹⁷¹ *Insecurity and violence in the post-2015 development agenda*, UNDP (2014)

¹⁷² This will be done through the perception surveys conducted in at least seven pilots that include questions on specific security needs for women; and the access to security, justice and human rights survey.

¹⁷³ The project will notably work closely with medical institutions in order to orient women victims of violence towards the available services through paralegals, in line with UPR recommendations (the recommendations on measures to combat violence against women were accepted by Lebanon at the 2015 UPR).

session (cf. Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, A/HRC/31/5/Add.1, p. 5 (2016))

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Conference Access to Justice for Syrian Communities, 22-23 September 2016, Byblos (conference proceedings to be published)

marginalized groups, from fully participating in decisions that may affect them			group that will require specific strategies to engage with at local level.	engage positively with the most vulnerable, notably Syrian Displaced. The project will also benefit from UNHCR expertise and as it is jointly implemented with UNHCR.
Risk 2: Duty-bearers do not have the capacity to meet their obligations in the Project	I = P = 2	Low	The purpose of this project is to enable the duty-bearers be better capacitated to fulfill their obligations and counter the deficiencies they have.	UNDP has conducted a sector-wide assessment that identified all risks and potential impact.
Risk 3: Security personnel that may pose a potential risk to health and safety of communities and/or individuals (e.g. due to a lack of adequate training or accountability)	I = 2 P = 3	Moderate	Security institutions have a state-security focus	The purpose of the project is to introduce community policing approach within security institutions, notably at local level
Other Risks are included in the Risk Log				
QUESTION 4: What is the overall Project risk categorization?				
Select one (see SESP for guidance)			Comments	
<i>Low Risk</i>			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
<i>Moderate Risk</i>			<input type="checkbox"/>	
<i>High Risk</i>			<input type="checkbox"/>	
QUESTION 5: Based on the identified risks and risk categorization, what requirements of the SES are relevant?				
Check all that apply			Comments	
Principle 1: Human Rights			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Principle 2: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
1. Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource Management			<input type="checkbox"/>	
2. Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation			<input type="checkbox"/>	
3. Community Health, Safety and Working Conditions			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
4. Cultural Heritage			<input type="checkbox"/>	
5. Displacement and Resettlement			<input type="checkbox"/>	
6. Indigenous Peoples			<input type="checkbox"/>	
7. Pollution Prevention and Resource Efficiency			<input type="checkbox"/>	

SESP Attachment 1. Social and Environmental Risk Screening Checklist

Checklist Potential Social and Environmental Risks	
Principles 1: Human Rights	Answer (Yes/No)
1. Could the Project lead to adverse impacts on enjoyment of the human rights (civil, political, economic, social or cultural) of the affected population and particularly of marginalized groups?	NO
2. Is there a likelihood that the Project would have inequitable or discriminatory adverse impacts on affected populations, particularly people living in poverty or marginalized or excluded individuals or groups? ¹⁷⁵	NO
3. Could the Project potentially restrict availability, quality of and access to resources or basic services, in particular to marginalized individuals or groups?	NO
3. Is there a likelihood that the Project would exclude any potentially affected stakeholders, in particular marginalized groups, from fully participating in decisions that may affect them? The risk exists since the most vulnerable groups identified in the project (Syrian Displaced, Youth and Women) are currently being marginalized in the communities. The project will reach out to various communities and partner with a wide-range of CSOs and CBOs. A periodic review of the geographical coverage and communities' coverage will be conducted throughout the project cycle to ensure that all groups are well-represented without any exclusion.	Yes
4. Is there a risk that duty-bearers do not have the capacity to meet their obligations in the Project? This is the purpose of the project –to enhance their capacity to better respond to communities' needs and fulfill their obligations	YES
6. Is there a risk that rights-holders do not have the capacity to claim their rights? The project is designed to work with duty-bearers and rights holders in a balanced manner. The right-holders, through working with CSOs, CBOs, TBA and BBA will be capacitated to claim their rights through different techniques as per outlined under Outputs 2 and 4.	YES
7. Have local communities or individuals, given the opportunity, raised human rights concerns regarding the Project during the stakeholder engagement process?	YES
8. Is there a risk that the Project would exacerbate conflicts among and/or the risk of violence to project-affected communities and individuals?	NO
Principle 2: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment	
1. Is there a likelihood that the proposed Project would have adverse impacts on gender equality and/or the situation of women and girls?	NO
2. Would the Project potentially reproduce discriminations against women based on gender, especially regarding participation in design and implementation or access to opportunities and benefits?	NO
3. Have women's groups/leaders raised gender equality concerns regarding the Project during the stakeholder engagement process and has this been included in the overall Project proposal and in the risk assessment?	YES
4. Would the Project potentially limit women's ability to use, develop and protect natural resources, taking into account different roles and positions of women and men in accessing environmental goods and services? <i>For example, activities that could lead to natural resources degradation or depletion in communities who depend on these resources for their livelihoods and well being</i>	NO
Principle 3: Environmental Sustainability: Screening questions regarding environmental risks are encompassed by the specific Standard-related questions below	

¹⁷⁵ Prohibited grounds of discrimination include race, ethnicity, gender, age, language, disability, sexual orientation, religion, political or other opinion, national or social or geographical origin, property, birth or other status including as an indigenous person or as a member of a minority. References to "women and men" or similar is understood to include women and men, boys and girls, and other groups discriminated against based on their gender identities, such as transgender people and transsexuals.

Standard 1: Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management		
1.1	Would the Project potentially cause adverse impacts to habitats (e.g. modified, natural, and critical habitats) and/or ecosystems and ecosystem services? <i>For example, through habitat loss, conversion or degradation, fragmentation, hydrological changes</i>	NO
1.2	Are any Project activities proposed within or adjacent to critical habitats and/or environmentally sensitive areas, including legally protected areas (e.g. nature reserve, national park), areas proposed for protection, or recognized as such by authoritative sources and/or indigenous peoples or local communities?	NO
1.3	Does the Project involve changes to the use of lands and resources that may have adverse impacts on habitats, ecosystems, and/or livelihoods? (Note: if restrictions and/or limitations of access to lands would apply, refer to Standard 5)	NO
1.4	Would Project activities pose risks to endangered species?	NO
1.5	Would the Project pose a risk of introducing invasive alien species?	NO
1.6	Does the Project involve harvesting of natural forests, plantation development, or reforestation?	NO
1.7	Does the Project involve the production and/or harvesting of fish populations or other aquatic species?	NO
1.8	Does the Project involve significant extraction, diversion or containment of surface or ground water? <i>For example, construction of dams, reservoirs, river basin developments, groundwater extraction</i>	NO
1.9	Does the Project involve utilization of genetic resources? (e.g. collection and/or harvesting, commercial development)	NO
1.10	Would the Project generate potential adverse transboundary or global environmental concerns?	NO
1.11	Would the Project result in secondary or consequential development activities which could lead to adverse social and environmental effects, or would it generate cumulative impacts with other known existing or planned activities in the area? <i>For example, a new road through forested lands will generate direct environmental and social impacts (e.g. felling of trees, earthworks, potential relocation of inhabitants). The new road may also facilitate encroachment on lands by illegal settlers or generate unplanned commercial development along the route, potentially in sensitive areas. These are indirect, secondary, or induced impacts that need to be considered. Also, if similar developments in the same forested area are planned, then cumulative impacts of multiple activities (even if not part of the same Project) need to be considered.</i>	NO
Standard 2: Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation		
2.1	Will the proposed Project result in significant ¹⁷⁶ greenhouse gas emissions or may exacerbate climate change?	NO
2.2	Would the potential outcomes of the Project be sensitive or vulnerable to potential impacts of climate change?	NO
2.3	Is the proposed Project likely to directly or indirectly increase social and environmental vulnerability to climate change now or in the future (also known as maladaptive practices)? <i>For example, changes to land use planning may encourage further development of floodplains, potentially increasing the population's vulnerability to climate change, specifically flooding</i>	NO
Standard 3: Community Health, Safety and Working Conditions		

¹⁷⁶ In regards to CO₂, 'significant emissions' corresponds generally to more than 25,000 tons per year (from both direct and indirect sources). [The Guidance Note on Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation provides additional information on GHG emissions.]

3.1	Would elements of Project construction, operation, or decommissioning pose potential safety risks to local communities?	NO
3.2	Would the Project pose potential risks to community health and safety due to the transport, storage, and use and/or disposal of hazardous or dangerous materials (e.g. explosives, fuel and other chemicals during construction and operation)?	NO
3.3	Does the Project involve large-scale infrastructure development (e.g. dams, roads, buildings)?	NO
3.4	Would failure of structural elements of the Project pose risks to communities? (e.g. collapse of buildings or infrastructure)	NO
3.5	Would the proposed Project be susceptible to or lead to increased vulnerability to earthquakes, subsidence, landslides, erosion, flooding or extreme climatic conditions?	NO
3.6	Would the Project result in potential increased health risks (e.g. from water-borne or other vector-borne diseases or communicable infections such as HIV/AIDS)?	NO
3.7	Does the Project pose potential risks and vulnerabilities related to occupational health and safety due to physical, chemical, biological, and radiological hazards during Project construction, operation, or decommissioning?	NO
3.8	Does the Project involve support for employment or livelihoods that may fail to comply with national and international labor standards (i.e. principles and standards of ILO fundamental conventions)?	NO
3.9	Does the Project engage security personnel that may pose a potential risk to health and safety of communities and/or individuals (e.g. due to a lack of adequate training or accountability)? The Project will follow the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) and will follow strict vetting process before of engaging with any security personnel. The purpose of this project is to capacitate the security service providers to improve their performance and address the abuses that usually occur by their practices (including through strengthening oversight mechanisms)	YES
Standard 4: Cultural Heritage		
4.1	Will the proposed Project result in interventions that would potentially adversely impact sites, structures, or objects with historical, cultural, artistic, traditional or religious values or intangible forms of culture (e.g. knowledge, innovations, practices)? (Note: Projects intended to protect and conserve Cultural Heritage may also have inadvertent adverse impacts)	NO
4.2	Does the Project propose utilizing tangible and/or intangible forms of cultural heritage for commercial or other purposes?	NO
Standard 5: Displacement and Resettlement		
5.1	Would the Project potentially involve temporary or permanent and full or partial physical displacement?	NO
5.2	Would the Project possibly result in economic displacement (e.g. loss of assets or access to resources due to land acquisition or access restrictions – even in the absence of physical relocation)?	NO
5.3	Is there a risk that the Project would lead to forced evictions? ¹⁷⁷	NO
5.4	Would the proposed Project possibly affect land tenure arrangements and/or community based property rights/customary rights to land, territories and/or resources?	NO
Standard 6: Indigenous Peoples		
6.1	Are indigenous peoples present in the Project area (including Project area of influence)?	NO

¹⁷⁷ Forced evictions include acts and/or omissions involving the coerced or involuntary displacement of individuals, groups, or communities from homes and/or lands and common property resources that were occupied or depended upon, thus eliminating the ability of an individual, group, or community to reside or work in a particular dwelling, residence, or location without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protections.

6.2	Is it likely that the Project or portions of the Project will be located on lands and territories claimed by indigenous peoples?	NO
6.3	Would the proposed Project potentially affect the human rights, lands, natural resources, territories, and traditional livelihoods of indigenous peoples (regardless of whether indigenous peoples possess the legal titles to such areas, whether the Project is located within or outside of the lands and territories inhabited by the affected peoples, or whether the indigenous peoples are recognized as indigenous peoples by the country in question)? <i>If the answer to the screening question 6.3 is "yes" the potential risk impacts are considered potentially severe and/or critical and the Project would be categorized as either Moderate or High Risk.</i>	NO
6.4	Has there been an absence of culturally appropriate consultations carried out with the objective of achieving FPIC on matters that may affect the rights and interests, lands, resources, territories and traditional livelihoods of the indigenous peoples concerned?	NO
6.5	Does the proposed Project involve the utilization and/or commercial development of natural resources on lands and territories claimed by indigenous peoples?	NO
6.6	Is there a potential for forced eviction or the whole or partial physical or economic displacement of indigenous peoples, including through access restrictions to lands, territories, and resources?	NO
6.7	Would the Project adversely affect the development priorities of indigenous peoples as defined by them?	NO
6.8	Would the Project potentially affect the physical and cultural survival of indigenous peoples?	NO
6.9	Would the Project potentially affect the Cultural Heritage of indigenous peoples, including through the commercialization or use of their traditional knowledge and practices?	NO
Standard 7: Pollution Prevention and Resource Efficiency		
7.1	Would the Project potentially result in the release of pollutants to the environment due to routine or non-routine circumstances with the potential for adverse local, regional, and/or transboundary impacts?	NO
7.2	Would the proposed Project potentially result in the generation of waste (both hazardous and non-hazardous)?	NO
7.3	Will the proposed Project potentially involve the manufacture, trade, release, and/or use of hazardous chemicals and/or materials? Does the Project propose use of chemicals or materials subject to international bans or phase-outs? <i>For example, DDT, PCBs and other chemicals listed in international conventions such as the Stockholm Conventions on Persistent Organic Pollutants or the Montreal Protocol</i>	NO
7.4	Will the proposed Project involve the application of pesticides that may have a negative effect on the environment or human health?	NO
7.5	Does the Project include activities that require significant consumption of raw materials, energy, and/or water?	NO